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T.R. 0.04% divorced women.

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In the matter of religion, here are the principal figures for the Russian Empire:

|                                  |        |
|----------------------------------|--------|
| Orthodox . . . . .               | 95.48% |
| Old Believers . . . . .          | 2.59%  |
| Catholics and Armenians. . . . . | 1.78%  |
| Protestants . . . . .            | 0.5 %  |
| Jews . . . . .                   | 0.8 %  |
| Mohammedans . . . . .            | 0.01%  |

In Russia, the concepts of Russia and of Orthodoxy are practically identical (except for the area of Kholm /35/ and for Byelorussia). In Austria and in Hungary, the Russians are for the greater part uniates (that is to say, united to the Church of Rome while preserving their own liturgical language and the custom of the marriage of their priests); only about 8% belong to the Eastern Church.

In the Kingdom of Poland, there were enumerated in 1897 78.8% Catholics, 4.4% Protestants, 14% Jews, and only 6.57% Orthodox (4.2% according to the census of 1906).

In the western guberniyas of the Empire, Chubinskii numbered even in 1870, 290,000 Ukrainian Catholics (in the guberniyas of Lublin and Siedliscze) and he declared that, although they belonged to the Roman Church, they called themselves Russians.

Recently, in the Russian district of Kholm, a certain number of individuals considered to be Orthodox, following the edict concerning religious liberty (17 April 1905), declared themselves to be Catholics. Frantsev estimates at 300,000 the number of conversions during the last three years. Thus the number of Ukrainian Catholics has considerably increased. On the other hand, there are some Catholic Byelorussians in Kurland, in the guberniyas of Vitebsk, Pskov, Suwalki, and Grodno, and in western Galicia there are many localities where a portion of the population is Catholic though claiming Russian as their mother tongue. Professor Floriński /36/ recently estimated the number of Russian Catholics at a million and a half.

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Movement of the Population. --The annual marriage rate, which especially permits an appreciation of the vitality of the nation, is higher in Russia than anywhere else. It is 9 per 1,000; the number of births is about 48 per 1,000 (3.4% of which are

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accessible date. The population increase for the entire province of Galicia between 1890 and 1900 was 16.7%. Of this number, according to Austrian statistics, the Poles furnished 14.52%, which would be an annual growth of 1.45%. (In this figure 15% Jews are included). The Russians contributed only 8.71%. In comparing these figures with previous ones we note the steady progress of the Poles. In 1851, 11.45% were estimated already in Cisleithania; in 1880, 14.86%; in 1890, 15.84%; in 1900, 16.59%. In Galicia, where the Poles are the masters of the country, their numbers increased by 14% in fifty years.

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In the matter of longevity, the rate is the same among the Poles as among the Galician Russians. The number of young people is above the average (30.4% being less than twenty years of age); the number of old people is very low; only 12% have passed fifty years of age.

The number of married persons is 32.3%. Among the Poles of Russia there have been enumerated 60.6% of unmarried men and 55.9% of unmarried women, 37% men and 36.3 % women married, 2.24% widowers and 7.64% widows, 0.05% men divorced, and 0.08% women divorced.

In the matter of the proportion of sexes, there are among the Poles of Galicia 1,049 women for every 1,000 men; in Russian Poland, the proportion is inverted, only 989 women. But it is evident that all of the soldiers were enumerated. /80/ The relationship of the two sexes, moreover, is a balanced one, save in the government of Lomza, where only 925 women were found for each 1,000 men.

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In the matter of religion, Catholicism is the characteristic religion of the Poles, as Orthodoxy is that of the Russians. There are no more Orthodox Poles, one might say, since the religious toleration was proclaimed in 1905. Old statistics, for example those of Lebedkine about 1860, stated that according to official documents there were 40,000 Orthodox Poles (uniates). There are also very few Poles who belong to the Evangelical church. They are to be found especially in Silesia and in the northern part of Prussia. On the other hand, the Mazuri of Prussia belong to the Evangelical church (96% in 1906), and this circumstance explains to us why they allow themselves to be easily Germanized. The Catholicism of the Poles is one of their strongest weapons against Germanization. In Austria only 83.14% Catholics

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are reported. This is explained by the fact that among those individuals who declared themselves to be Poles there were 14.7% Jews. There are 1.8% Protestants. Therefore, one may consider Catholic to be synonymous with Pole.

In Russian Poland the proportion is as follows: 78.8% Catholics; 4.7% Protestants; 14.05% Jews; and 6.57% Orthodox, or "old believers" of the Orthodox Church.

The Catholics here are concentrated on the /81/ left bank of the Vistula, where they are estimated at 70 to 80%. The guberniyas of Siedlec and of Lublin are the only ones in the kingdom where as few as 66 to 62% Catholics are to be found, if one believes the census of 1897. After the edict of religious tolerance of 17 April 1905 the proportions changed noticeably (see above in S. 5), but we have no strictly precise data.

With respect to the Poles of Russia, here are the latest statistical results:

|                                        |        |
|----------------------------------------|--------|
| Orthodox and "old believers" . . . . . | 0.63%  |
| Roman Catholics . . . . .              | 98.26% |
| Protestants . . . . .                  | 0.51%  |
| Jews . . . . .                         | 0.59%  |
| Mohammedans . . . . .                  | 0.01%  |

Polish is, therefore, synonymous with Catholic. But it must be noted that among the Catholics there has recently developed a sect called Mariavites to which in 1906, 59,000 persons belonged. It is in the Russian section that the Polish population provides the largest contingent in the cities and large towns, 22.1%. Among these are found 1.9% nobles and officials, 0.8% clergy, 0.14% of honorary bourgeois and of merchants, 23.5% bourgeois, 72.98% farmers. Among the Poles of Austria there are 65.6% laborers, 14.8% factory workers, 11.2% tradesmen, and 8.4% officials.

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From the point of view of public education the Poles still have far to go, not only in Russia and in Prussia, where the government has placed numerous obstacles in the way of the development of the schools, but also where they have for a long time enjoyed complete liberty, namely in Galicia. In this province statistics still report 40.8% illiterate. Furthermore it must be recognized that the Poles in Russia (notably the

161 German, one arrives at the figure of 116,810 individuals, and, if this figure is corrected according to the estimates of Parczewski, of Swjela\*, and of Muka, about 156,000 persons are obtained, a lamentable total for a people surrounded and penetrated from all sides by the German flood. What favors Germanization is the extent to which the Sorbs

[177] are economically dependent upon the Germans: the military service, preaching in German, the absence of an intellectual class, their complete isolation. The Sorbs who resist most energetically are those of Upper Lusatia, whose intellectual center is at Bautzen (Budysin). In Saxony, of 297 communes called Wends (1), according to the census

1. The Sorbs of Lusatia are called Wends in German. of 1900, there are in all 225 with a Slav majority, and only 7 entirely Slav.

167 We have no other data on the Lusatians or on their emigration. It appears that there are colonies in America (especially in Texas--Serbin (a town), which recalls the name of the nation, Giddingswenden (probably the town of Giddings), West (perhaps the town of West Point) Yewa (not located), Warda (a town), Burleson (a county) whose inhabitants left Europe towards the middle of the last century, and who still preserve the national tradition. There are also some in Australia (at Angerspark, at Adelaide near Melbourne). They are of more recent origin.

775 The great majority of the Sorbs are Lutherans; there are 15,000  
162 Catholics, who live for the most part in the neighborhood of Budysin (Bautzen).

197 /98/ S 19. Differentiation. --Even though they are only a small  
182 nation, the Sorbs are not unified from the linguistic point of view. The difference between the idioms of Upper and Lower Lusatia is so great that the common people have great difficulty in understanding one another and many linguists have recognized two distinct languages. There are in fact two literary languages founded upon the two dialects which are farthest apart (that of Kottbus and that of Bautzen) and two literatures. This duality creates a grave danger, the much more so as the two fractions are divided from a political viewpoint. Kottbus belongs to Prussia and Bautzen to Saxony. Aside from the language, the two Lusatian groups differ from many viewpoints in matters of domestic  
101 life and costume. According to Muka, the boundary between the two  
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of immigration of Germans among the Czechs is practically insignificant. On the contrary, in these ten last years 70,000 to 90,000 Slavs have left Bohemia. Formerly it was above all emigration to America which weakened the Czechs. Today this movement has slowed down, but it is rather considerable among the Slovaks and it suffices to explain to us the very minor increase of the population group which in 1851 constituted 13% of the total population of Transleithania, in 1886, 12%, in 1890, 11%, and in 1900 only 10.5%. In these last thirty years, according to Stodola, there have emigrated from the 12 Slovak counties 307,000 persons--especially into America. Now, from 1850 to 1900, the total increase of the Magyars was 80%; these figures include, it is true, 25% other nationalities more or less Magyarized, which would make 1.6% a year; the increase /122/ of Slovaks has been only 0.66% a year.

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From the point of view of popular education and the restricted number of illiterates, the Czech national group holds the first rank among the Slav peoples. The Czechs are even superior to the Germans of Austria; for, according to the official statistics, there are in Bohemia 93.77% who know how to read and write, 91.84% among the Germans, 68.53% among the Slovenes, 47.52% among the Poles, and 21.87% among the Russians and Ruthenians.

In Hungary, in the purely Slovak counties, the number of illiterates is 32%; in the counties of the center where there are mixtures of Magyars and Russians, it is 42%.

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In the matter of professions, 43.1% of the Czechs devote themselves to agriculture, 36.5% to industry, 9.3% to commerce and the transportation business, 11.1% to public services. From the industrial viewpoint, only the Germans surpass the Czechs by two percentage points (38.5%); from the point of view of agriculture, the Czechs come after the Poles (65%), the Slovenes (75%), the Serbo-Croats 89%, and the Russians of Galicia (63%).

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In the matter of religion, the Czechs are for the most part Catholics (96.15%). It is figured that there are 2.4% Protestants. Among the Slovaks of Hungary the proportions are no longer the same. There are figured to be 70.2% /123/ Catholics, 5% uniates, 23% Protestants of the Augsburg confession.

1: Niederle--91 E-5 1911 *Slavic Peoples E/6*

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*Slovenes E F 7*  
*In the matter of the birth rate, during these latter years it has*  
been very low in Carniola: between 1890 and 1900, 1.84%; the birth-  
rate for Austria taken all together is 9.44%. Between 1880 and 1890  
the coefficient was 9.44%. For all of the Slovenes taken together  
the coefficient is only 1.37%.

Therefore, the development of the nation appears to be arrested.  
This phenomenon is due in part to denationalization, in part to  
emigration, and in part to inexact census figures.

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From the religious viewpoint the Slovenes are almost entirely  
Catholics (99.9%). In respect to occupations, 75.4% devote themselves  
to farming, 13.4% to industry, 3.5% to trade, and 7.7% to public  
services.

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S 28. Differentiation. --From a linguistic viewpoint there are  
rather numerous differences; but they are not very deep (see what is  
said further along regarding the dialectology of the southern Slavs).  
To designate the various groups within the nation, the Slovenes usually  
give themselves geographic names, borrowed from their political  
boundaries: Kranjci (Carniolians), Primorci /145/ (people of the  
seacoast), Korosci (Carinthians), Gorican (Goricians), Styrians, or  
names of an even more local character, borrowed from the orography  
and the hydrography. In Styria there are singled out the Pohorjanci, the  
Poljanci of the Mura and of the Drava, the Haložane, in Carniola  
the Gorenjci (people from above), Dolenjci (people from below), and  
the Notranjci who speak different dialects. To the north of the Mura,  
the Prekmurci (Transmurians) present an interesting type. In the north-  
west of Istria the Savrini or Bresavi are also pure-blooded Slovenes, as  
are the Berkini in the north of Istria. On the contrary the Ficki in  
the outskirts of the town of Buzet (Pinguente) and the Cici are Croats  
of the kaikavski and cakavski dialects. (1) Likewise, the White

1. Although certain philologists attach the Kaikavci of Croatia  
to the Slovenes, we relegate them to the next chapter; they  
consider themselves to be Croats.

Krainjci--so called from their costume--who are settled between  
Kocevje and the Kupa River are also of the kaikavski dialect.

A very interesting group, particularly studied by Professor  
Beaudoin de Courtenay (2), is the group of Resians established in the

1: Niederle--105 E-5 1911 EN/Slavic Peoples E16

Serbs EF6  
Croats EF4

the net increase 0.98%.

In the Kingdom of Serbia, the rate, for a period of ten years, was still greater; gross total, 14.8%, net total, 14.2%, otherwise speaking, the birth rate exceeded the death rate by 1.48%. During these latter years, one notes a much more considerable increase but it results from the large number of migrations of persons fleeing from the Turkish territory. The same may be said for Bosnia and Hercegovina, where, as a result of immigration, an abnormal increase was produced at the end of the last century (from 1879 to 1895, 2.15% on an average). Between 1901 and 1904, the increase was only 0.95% per year.

In the north, the Croats and the Serbs are threatened by the Magyars in Hungary and by the Germans in Croatia. The Magyars and the Germans are greatly increasing in number in Croatia. In the space of ten years, from 1880 to 1890, the Serbo-Croats in this province increased by 12.23%, the Germans by 41.3%, the Magyars by 66.1%. In the years 1890 to 1900, the Slavs increased by 8.96%, the Germans by 13.12%, the Magyars by 36.3%. Thus, between 1880 and 1900, the relative number /168/ of Slavs decreased from 90.48% to 87.22%; that of the Germans increased from 4.4% to 5.53%, that of the Magyars from 2.19% to 3.74%.

This state of affairs is not yet very serious, but nevertheless it gives rise to concern about the future.

The Serbs and the Croats should agree to resist with a common front, all the more as their birth rate is weak, weaker in the areas inhabited solely by them than in the areas with mixed population and as they are constantly diminished by emigration. Between 1880 and 1900 this took away from them more than 100,000 souls and in these recent times the Croats have emigrated in rather large numbers into the two sections of America.

We have already pointed out the decrease in the numbers of Serbs in the area of Novi Pazar and Kosovo. Alongside the Orthodox Serbs there are to be found today in this zone many Albanianized Mohammedan Serbs--notably of the tribes of the Gash and of the Berish, also 6,000 Cherkessians who settled there in the years 1858-1862. In this zone there are no Turks properly speaking.

According to Turkish statistics, in the plain of Kosovo, that is to say in the kazas of Pristina, Vucitrn and Mitrovia, there are 80,000 Mohammedans and 22,000 Orthodox; according to private Serbian statistics there are only 1,956 Serb homes with 14,000 persons. Kancov in 1901 counted at Novi Pazar, Kosovo, and Metokhia, 250,000 Albanians, 100,000 Serbs, and 90,000 Bosnians /169/ who spoke Serbian, while being Mohammedans and enemies of the Serbs.

In the matter of population density, the areas occupied by the Croats and the Serbs are particularly well divided. In Montenegro, it is figured that there are 18 persons per square kilometer, in Bosnia-Hercegovina 30.7, in Dalmatia 46, in Serbia 51.6, in Croatia-Slavonia 56.8, in Istria 69, at Gorica 80, on the seacoast 95. The ratio between the two sexes is particularly interesting. In comparison with other Austrian areas the masculine sex is much more numerous; but the proportions vary according to the areas. Thus for each 1,000 men there are in Dalmatia 976 women, in Istria 933, at Gorica 970, along the seacoast 973, in Serbia 945.6, in Bosnia 893.4, in Montenegro 882. On the average, throughout the Austrian territory, for every 1,000 men there are 974 women. In Croatia-Slavonia the number is 988, and if we count only the men--leaving out the army--the figure rises to 1,011. Vrbanc gives for 1,000 men 963 women, and he explains the reasons for this ratio. Many more males than females are born here, and during the early part of life there are fewer who die than in the rest of Europe. During the first year the number of deaths is 8.3% for Bulgaria, 21.2% for Croatia, 16.3% for Serbia.

Vrbanc gathered in 1896 very interesting data /170/ on the birth rate of the southern Slavs, notably the Serbo-Croats. It is true that they are based upon anterior facts, but they are still of interest.

He finds 40% of the people married among the Serbo-Croats. Serbia especially presents unusual figures.

According to the statistics of 1900 there are only 25.4% unmarried and 67.7 married; 36% of the men and 57% of the women are married before the age of twenty years. Among the Serbo-Croats of Austria, the unmarried are estimated at 58.6% and married persons only at 35.4%. In Croatia-Slavonia, in 1900, above the age of fifteen, 30% of the men were unmarried, and 22.7 of the women, and 63.7% and 64.5% were married. In Serbia, the number of births is 44.45



1: Niederle--107 E-5 1911 *El/Slavic Peoples* ~~EN~~

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163* In Serbia, ~~number of births~~ <sup>Serbs EFC</sup> <sup>Croats EFC</sup> is 44.45 per 1,000; in Croatia, 44.18; in Dalmatia, 38.39; in Istria 37.43. In Bulgaria the rate is only 36.36. But if we take into consideration only the legal marriages, we ascertain that for every 1,000 women there were 290 births at Gorica, 273 in Istria, 257 in Dalmatia, 215 in Serbia (same figure in Bulgaria). This is a relatively low birth rate, and, in Serbia and Croatia, the lowest in Europe. Thus it seems that the large number of births depends only upon the number of marriages and not upon fecundity.

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165* /171/ According to Vrbancic the death rate is 30.24 per 1,000 in Croatia, 27.79 in Istria, 27.16 at Gorica, 25.67 in Serbia, 24.38 in Dalmatia. (It is only 18.00 in Bulgaria). The death rate is then higher in Serbia than in Bulgaria. In Bulgaria, in fact, far fewer infants died during their first year (8.3% only, 16.3% in Serbia, 15.4% in Dalmatia, 21.2% in Croatia). The rate of increase through births is, then, 1.83% for Bulgaria, 1.87% for Serbia, 1.4% for Dalmatia, 1.39% for Croatia, 0.98% for Gorica, 0.96% for Istria, which gives an average for the southern Slavs of 1.57%.

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75* Religion is one of the principal marks which distinguish the Croats from the Serbs: the Croats are Catholics, the Serbs Orthodox and Mohammedans. But this is not an absolute indication. There are Orthodox who consider themselves to be Croats. Thus the latest Croat statistics give 2,075 more Orthodox than the Serbs who were enumerated (616,518 Orthodox against 614,543 Serbs). And there also are numerous Catholics who consider themselves to be Serbs or who are claimed by the Serbs. Such are, for example, the Catholics of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) and of the Gulf of Kotor (Cattaro), or the Sokci, the Bunievci and the Krasovani of Hungary.

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[167]* In the Kingdom of Serbia, Serb means Orthodox. There are 98.7% Orthodox, /172/ 0.40% Catholic, 0.60% Mohammedan. In 1895 there were 548,632 Serbian Mohammedans in Bosnia-Hercegovina (that is 34.9% of the population). But it must be stated that they are decreasing through emigration. Official statistics have, between 1883 and 1905, given 32,625 emigrants of whom 30,434 were Mohammedan. In Bosnia and Hercegovina there were reported 637,246 Orthodox (that is 42.9% of the total population), and 334,142 (21.3%) Catholic. (1)  
1. In Bosnia-Hercegovina the Mohammedans are in the majority at Sarajevo and in 12 districts, the Orthodox in 25, the Catholics



serbs 55%  
Croats 44%

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in 12. During the first years which followed the Austrian occupation, emigration was quite considerable; it still continues, but it is slowing down. The official figures for 1906 give 590,900 Mohammedans, 760,000 Orthodox, and 360,000 Catholics. Mr. Florinskii figures for the entire Balkens 820,000 Mohammedan Serbs.

In Dalmatia in 1900 there were 96,279 Orthodox, 496,778 Catholics which gives 16.2% and 83.6%. The other Austrian areas are Catholic (Istria 99.6%, the seacoast 98.5%). In Croatia and in Slavonia there are 1,721,416 Catholics, and 616,518 Orthodox, that is 71.2% and 25.5%. The total figures for the censuses of Budapest and Zagreb are not completely in accord, but the proportion remains the same. In Montenegro, according to Vrbanic, there are 87.5% Orthodox, 3.1% Catholics, and 9.3% Mohammedans whom Vrbanic considers as Slavs.

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From the viewpoint of education /173/ the Serbo-Croats are very much behind. Throughout Austrian territory the number of illiterates reaches 74.14%, in Croatia 54.4% and even 56%, if one is to believe the Hungarian statistics. It is especially Dalmatia which is backward. In 1900, 64.8% of the men and 86.6% of the women did not know how to read or write. Teaching is also greatly neglected in Istria and still more in the Balkan countries about which we do not have any documentation except in the Serbian statistics. There are in Serbia only 21.3% literate (55% in the towns and 15% in the villages).

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With regard to occupations, the Serbs and the Croats are primarily an agricultural people. In Istria and in Dalmatia there are 86.9% farmers (industry 4.6%, commerce 3.8%, public services 4.7%). In Bosnia-Hercegovina 88.34%. In the Kingdom of Serbia 85.23% of the population devote themselves to agriculture and to raising cattle.

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S 32. Internal Differentiation. --The Serbs and the Croats do not differ greatly either from the physical viewpoint, or from that of linguistics or in the manner of living. Differences have been created solely by the political situation, by religion, and by literature. There are, however, certain shades of differences and certain special groups which we mentioned a short time ago. <sup>2</sup>

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From the anthropological viewpoint there is, as far as we know at present, a much greater /174/ difference between the Serbo-Croats and the other Slavs than between the Serbs and the Croats

<sup>2</sup> [cf. cat. 116, pp. 92-95, 105-106, 107--Analyst]

1: Niederle--125 E-5 1911 *Slavic Peoples* *E/6*  
*Bulgaria EEI*

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in 1900 about 12,000 (according to V. Cintula). In 1891 the statistics numbered them at /201/ 23,000; but it confused other Slavs with the Bulgars, for example the Serbs of Krasso.

In America, Valjavec figured on 4,000 Bulgars, but obviously this is too few, for in the most recent statistics the Bulgars are always placed with the Serbs. We have seen that in Russia statistics for 1897 enumerated 172,659.

It is in Turkey that estimates are most difficult. For Macedonia I have followed the figures of Kanchov, in regard to his opinion upon the Macedonian problem.

Cvijic has estimated the number of Slavs in the vilayets of Kosovo, of Salonica, and of Bitolj to be 1,300,000 (450,000; 500,000; 340,000). Brankov and Skopalski have figured on 1,172,000 Bulgars; in Turkish Rumelia I have counted the Pomaks among the Bulgars. In the vilayet of Adrianople, Mach estimated the number of Bulgars at 370,000 of the Orthodox religion and 115,000 of the Mohammedan religion.

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According to a census conducted by Hilmi Pasha and reported by M. Rene Pinon (of which the results are far from being exact), there were in the vilayet of Kosovo 164,476 Patriarchists, 184,912 Exarchists (1), 420,388 Mohammedans; in the vilayet of Bitolj, 309,759 Greek

1. Spiritual subjects of the Bulgarian Exarch of Constantinople, otherwise Bulgars.

Patriarchists, /202/ 11,301 Rumanians, 8,461 Serbs, 178,527 Exarchists, 509,307 Mohammedans; in the vilayet of Salonica, 311,982 Greek Patriarchists, 24,377 Rumanians, 244,723 Exarchists, 531,431 Mohammedans. For these three vilayets, Monsienn Pinon, accepting the old statistics of certain districts, gave a total of 3,267,265 souls, of whom 1,795,359 were Mohammedans and only about 600,000 Bulgarian Exarchists. He counted 850,000 Greek, Rumanian, and Serbian Patriarchists; but of this number the Serbs make up only a very insignificant total.

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Other statistical data, for well known reasons, can be applied only to the Bulgars of the Kingdom. This is the only country which provides statistical data. We shall study them here on the basis of the work of Urbanic, who goes back to the census of 1888.

000 work of Vrbanc, who goes back to the census of 1888.

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He<sup>1</sup> presents the following results:

[162] Among the Bulgars the number of men is 1,000 for every 965 women; the males show an excess of births of 54.2%; the ratio between single persons to married persons is for men, 53%; for women 41.9% (4.4% widowers). The birth rate is 36.36 per 1,000; it is below that of the Serbs; on the contrary, the death rate is less than among these, only 18. (compare the figures given above in Section 31). In Bulgaria very few infants die during the first year. They have the lowest infant mortality of any among the South-Slavs /203/ (8.3% only, against 15.4% in Dalmatia, 16.3% in Serbia, 21.2% in Croatia). As a result of this peculiarity, the coefficient of the excess of births over deaths is, if Jirecek is to be believed, as favorable as in Serbia, it represents 1.83. For the years 1881-1887, Sarafov found an increase of 1.85 (during this period there were born 100 boys for 89.7 girls); for the period 1890-1900, the coefficient was, it seems, slightly less. More recently, Jurkevich suggested the figure of 1.5 for the north of Bulgaria and of 1.2 for the south.

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According to Popov, the population density is 38.8 inhabitants per square kilometer.

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From the religious viewpoint the Bulgars belong to the Eastern Orthodox Church. They have a church of their own whose head, called The Exarch, lives at Orta-koi (now Ivailovgrad) near Constantinople. Along with the Orthodox majority, one finds two dissident groups. The first of these is the Catholic Bulgars, or Paulitians (Pavlikiani). They speak the eastern dialect and live in the districts of Nikopol, of Svishtov, in seven villages in the outskirts of Plovdiv (Philippopolis). There is also a Catholic community at Berdovski Geran, near Byala Slatina, and another, that of Gostilia, near Oryakhovo (district of Vratsa). All of them originated in the region of Plovdiv or Philippopolis, which was formerly their center. They formerly composed a whole series of communities between Plovdiv and /204/ Nikopol. It is from these that there came the colonies of Bulgars who settled in Hungary (Vinga, Besenov), and who are Catholics.

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Another rather sizeable section is composed of the Bulgars who, under Turkish domination, embraced Islam. They are called Pomaks.

<sup>1</sup> [i.e. Vrbanc, cf. cat. 116, p. 125--Analyst]

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They have settled by preference in the Rhodope (Grk., Rodope), where they constitute a rather large group between Plovdiv and Salonica. They are met with here and there to the north of the Balkans in the region of Lovech, Pleven (Plevna), especially between the Vid and Panega Rivers, to the south of Pleven. In the Kingdom of Bulgaria their number has greatly diminished; for, as a result of their Turkish sympathies, they have since 1878 been in perpetual conflict with the other Bulgars. The latest statistics numbered 20,644 of them in Bulgaria, of whom 17,055 were in the district of Plovdiv (Philippopolis) and 2,837 in that of Pleven.

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From the viewpoint of education, the Bulgars are not very much advanced, which is explained by the difficult conditions in which they have lived, deprived of all the advantages of civilization. They are now making an effort to make up for lost time. According to the latest statistics the number of literate persons in the principality was an average of 28.4%. The districts may be placed in the following order:

Ruse 38.5%; Shumla 35.9%; Varna 34%; Trnovo /205/ 34%; Plovdiv (Philippopolis) 29.6%; Burgas 29.4%; Sofia 28.8%; Stara Zagora 28.3%; Pleven 23.1%; Kustendil 20.1%; Vidin 19.8%; Vratsa 19%. The highest degree of education is found naturally in the regions of the great cities: 60% at Sofia, Ruse, and Varna; 49% at Plovdiv; 47% at Kotel and at Shumla; 37% at Kazanluk. The least literate areas are those of Radomir (20%), Tsaribrod (now Dimitrovgrad) (19%), Kyzilagatch (19%), Berkovitsa (16%), Kula (14%), Belogradchik (13%), Ferdinandovo (13%).

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S 38. Internal Differentiation.--The Bulgars are divided into three groups from the point of view of language.

1). That of the western dialect: it is bounded on the east by a line which starts from the confluence of the Vid and the Danube and runs towards Salonica across the regions of Nikopol, Pleven, Lovech, Teteven, Pirdop, Novo Selo, Panagyurishte, Ikhtiman, Chepino, Rezlog, Nevrokop, Melnik, Petrich, Demir Hissar (now Siderokastron), Seres, and Salonica.

2). The eastern group is divided into two branches:

A. That of the northeast where the people bear the general name of Zagortsi (Mountaineers), or Khertsoi\*, or Poliantsi\*.

B. That of the southeast, or branch of the Rhodope, whose



S.P.  
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local designations. The peoples are called Mervatsi who are settled between the Struma and the Rhodope Mountains in the area of Serrai, Demir Hissar (now Siderokastron), Melnik, Drama, Nevrokop (now Delchev) and Bratsigovo. In western Macedonia there is a region called Mala Reka, "The Little River", whose inhabitants have received the name of Miak\*. They call the inhabitants of Kichevo, Bitolia, Prilep and Tito Veles the Brsiak: (compare the Greek Bersetai). Among the other Macedonian names, Kanchov mentions the Esti on the right bank of the Black Drin, the Kekovtsi in the region of Popolie, the Pulivakovtsi in the western part of the plain of Salonica, the Ketskari, the Uliufs. Let us also mention /208/ the Touriaki and the Torlaki whose name is also applied by the inhabitants of Sofia to the inhabitants of the regions of Piroi and of Tsaribrod, the Tokuntsi, the Niniovtsi, the Marachi between the Osem and the Isker (now Sibir), etc.

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The Mohammedan Bulgars who live near the sources of the Arda are called Ashrians; this name comes from the ancient form Agariane, the children of Agar (1); between the Dospat and the Mesta and so on. On this name see the index of my Chronicle supposedly by Nestor. Translator.  
 are found the Tseshtentsi and, below the Chardagh, the Torbechi.

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We have spoken above (Section 33<sup>A</sup>) of the names of the old Bulgars. An enigmatic appellation is also given them. They are called the Khrisoi, and this word generally means an uncouth man, a rustic. They are spread out between the Black Sea and the Isker (now Sibir) and also in the region of Vidin and to the south as far as the Stamdja Planina (Mountains). They speak the dialect of the northeast and may be distinguished by their special costume. Likewise, the costume of the women is distinguished by the somber color of the woolen gown called sukman.

The immigrants from the Balkans who come into the regions of Shumen, or Razgrad, and of Ruse are called by the natives "The Blacks;" because of the color of their breeches. In western Bulgaria "the wearers of white" and "the wearers of black" are distinguished. Other sobriquets are due to the cut of the breeches.

We owe special mention to the Schopi. They inhabit especially the mountainous region of Kustendil, Kratovo, Radomir, Breznik and

<sup>1</sup>[cf. *cf. cit.* 116, pp. 113-118--Analysis]



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C.M.  
643 exaggerated claims, without counting Turkey which is today the proprietor of the contested territory, without speaking of the Great Powers, especially Russia, Italy, and Austria, who have their eye on Macedonia.

000 From all of this whirlpool of literary, political, and scientific endeavors, a disinterested observer can draw today only these obvious conclusions:

S.P.  
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181 1). The Slavs of Macedonia and of Old Serbia represent a people whose national consciousness is not yet completely and equally developed, if we compare them with the two neighboring nations.

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[795] However, it is beyond doubt that the largest portion of this people feel themselves and proclaim themselves to be Bulgars, that they belong to the independent Bulgarian Church, whose head is the Exarch resident at Ortakioi. (1) On the other hand, it is certain that the

1. According to Brankov, there are in Macedonia 77% Exarchists and 23% Patriarchists. According to Hilmi, the proportion is entirely different. See above in Section 37. <sup>1</sup>/<sub>A</sub> name Bulgars is an historic name in these regions and that it has not been brought in through the religious propaganda of these recent years. Even though these regions were once annexed to the Serbian State, yet the name Serb has not taken root among the people. This is why in recent times the Bulgarian propaganda, both ecclesiastical and political, has found a very deep response throughout the country; Serbian propaganda has a chance of future success only in the northern region which is in contact with the Serbian Kingdom and has direct dealings with it; this region is Old Serbia.

S.P.  
C.M.  
197 2). From a philological point of view it is true that the language of the Slavs of Macedonia presents an aggregation of local dialects rather distinct from one another. They form a sort of idiom which is intermediate between the Serbian stokavski and the Bulgarian language proper. (1) But taken altogether and in certain details it is much more

1. See Section 32, above. <sup>2</sup>/<sub>A</sub>

S.P.  
C.M.  
[194]  
[195] closely related to the Bulgarian than to the Serbian. These special traits are the use of the postpositive article (used after the substantive), the loss of declension and the retention of the nasals. Only the dialect of the northern region is more closely related to the dialect group of Vranje, Nish, Timok, which Professor Belic assigns to the domain of the Serbian language, but certain philologists do not agree with him.

*The Primitive Slavs*

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It was to this district, centering about the city of Czernowitz, that many Polish officials and soldiers withdrew to escape German and Russian pursuit when Poland was invaded in 1939. [101] [131] [197]

The Western Slavic group includes the Poles, the Czechs (or Bohemians) and Moravians, the Slovaks, and two Slavic islands in German territory: the Kashubs, who live on the Baltic coast northwest of Danzig, probably not over two hundred thousand in number, and a considerably smaller number of Sorbs, or Wends, who inhabit Lausitz, or Lusatia, a small area on the upper Spree river northeast of Dresden. [161]

The Southern Slavs are cut off from their northern kindred by the Austrian Germans, the Magyars, and the Romanians, but comprise the Slovenes in the extreme northern part of Yugoslavia; the Serbs and the Croatians, who differ from one another only in slight variations of dialect and by the fact that the Serbs belong to the Greek Orthodox church and use the Cyrillic Script (similar to the Russian), while the Croatians are Catholics and use the Latin alphabet; and the Bulgarians who, though possessing a Slavic national language, represent a complex fusion of racial and linguistic stocks. [795] [212] ●

In view of the numerous and violent migratory movements which took place in northern Europe both before the Christian era and during the first few centuries after it began, the Slavs are hardly likely to have occupied their present extensive territory during their whole recorded history. On the contrary, their migrations cover a range almost as vast as those of their Germanic neighbors, and the location of their primitive habitat constitutes a problem which has long engaged students of Slavic history and linguistics. 174 167

The earliest native tradition dealing with Slavic origins is contained in the so-called Russian *Primary Chronicle*, a compilation completely extant only in two fourteenth-century texts, but which reproduce with considerable accuracy a work composed by a monk of Kïev about the end of the eleventh century. Here we read: 101 174 113

### III

## *Conversion and Religious Divisions*

175\* While conversion to Christianity was an inevitable phase of  
186 the process by which the Slavs were drawn into the general  
797 movement of European civilization, it was by no means an  
unmixed blessing. When Slavic tribes had evolved to some  
semblance of national consciousness and even statehood, or  
were sufficiently remote from the center where religious in-  
fluence was exempt from political pressure, they were able to  
retain their independence and to follow a characteristic course  
of development. But if they lived on the periphery of a power-  
ful and aggressive Christian state, their political independence  
was frequently threatened, and if this state cherished colonial  
aims, the convert Slavs were very likely to face the choice be-  
tween assimilation and enslavement, or, at the very worst, com-  
plete extermination.

797 The section of the medieval church which brought about the  
●795 conversion was also a factor of durable historical weight. The  
178 Western Church was devoted to the tradition of Latin culture.  
779 It insisted on the celebration of the Mass in the hallowed  
197 language of the Church. Hence it evinced little concern for the  
175\* creation of any vernacular culture. Though not possessed of  
the same vitality, the Eastern Church soon found that it could  
evangelize the various pagans on the long Byzantine frontier  
more effectively if it allowed them to use their native languages

*Conversion and Religious Divisions* 53

in the service. Hence, though much of early south or east Slavic literature is either translated or imitated, the fact remains that the Slavs under Byzantine intellectual and religious influence developed significant national cultures much more rapidly than those under the domination of Rome. That these cultures, after a brilliant initial spurt, were later retarded and even brought to a halt which lasted several centuries is due, not to the source of conversion itself, but to historical accidents which supervened after conversion took place. Had not the Eastern and the Southern Slavs fallen victims, in one case to Tartar invasion and in the other to Turkish conquest, their intellectual lag in comparison with the rest of Europe would not have been so great. The Russians, for example, were completely deprived of all Western stimulation after the middle of the thirteenth century and nearly three hundred years elapsed before they entered upon the difficult process of assimilating the Western culture which had developed during that long and critical interval. The South Slavs, on the other hand, shook off the Turkish yoke only within the last century and thus were even more handicapped than the Russians in their struggle to catch up with the modern world.

Of all the Slavs, the Slovenes in Carinthia and Carniola were the first to encounter missionary activities. Early in the seventh century, they had been temporarily combined with Czechs and Sorbs north of the Danube in the semilegendary kingdom under Samo, who led them victoriously against the Avars and simultaneously offered a temporary barrier to Frankish expansion southward. During his declining years in Switzerland, Saint Columban, the great Irish missionary, had thought, as early as 612, of setting out from Bregenz on a mission to the nearest Slavs, but, finding the task too difficult for his advanced age (he was already sixty-nine), he retired to Italy and ended his days at Bobbio.

After Samo disappeared from the scene and his realm was dissolved, the Slovenes were unable to withstand the Avars, who soon held the Danube as far as the Enns. The Slovenes

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175\* Methodius became abbot of the monastery of Polychron, in the vicinity of Mount Olympus.

175\* The two brothers were recalled from their retirement by  
212 Michael III when Rostislav's mission asked for Slavic-speaking priests. Constantine in particular had demonstrated considerable linguistic talent on his mission to Khazaria, where he had learned Hebrew, and it is certain that both brothers spoke the Bulgarian dialect which prevailed in the environs of their native city. Upon accepting the mission, and before proceeding to Moravia, Constantine invented a Slavic alphabet, and translated into the Slavic dialect he knew a selection of passages from the Gospels.

[779] This translation is the beginning of all Slavic literature, but the nature of the alphabet invented by Constantine is questionable. We have, as it happens, two early Slavic alphabets, the so-called Glagolitic, somewhat enigmatic in origin, and the Cyrillic, which is a combination of the Greek and Latin alphabets with some additions for specifically Slavic sounds. This latter is the ancestor of the modern Russian, Serbian, and Bulgarian scripts. On account of the difficulty of the Glagolitic, it was later supplanted in Bulgaria by the Cyrillic, which is relatively close to the Greek. On purely psychological grounds, but in utter disagreement with many much more authoritative teachers and colleagues, I believe that the priority belongs to Cyrillic, since Constantine would (I assume), if only for reasons of convenience, have used an alphabet as close as possible to the one with which he was most familiar. Then later in Moravia, when he found that the German clergy viewed with suspicion and hostility everything Greek, I believe that he devised the tricky and crabbed Glagolitic, which does not resemble Greek script at all, to disarm his opponents.

175\* Accompanied by a few Greek priests who also knew Slavic,  
797 Constantine and Methodius arrived in Moravia during the  
796 spring of 863. They were well received by Prince Rostislav,

*Conversion and Religious Divisions*

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though the local clergy from Passau and Regensburg viewed them as dangerous rivals, for these Greeks were scholars and men of action who had the advantage of speaking the local language. At first they celebrated Mass in Greek, which was as incomprehensible to the masses as the Latin of the Frankish clergy. Constantine then hastened to translate the whole service, which only added to the resentment of their competitors, despite the fact that he actually translated not the Byzantine ritual but the Latin missal. In Western eyes this was a drastic and unparalleled innovation. Whatever Rostislav's good intentions were, he was not for long in a position to support the Greeks wholeheartedly, for in the autumn of 864 he had been attacked and once more reduced to vassalage by Louis the German. Yet the mission prospered to the point where the problem of ordaining new priests presented itself. Constantine even made a visit to the son of Pribina, Prince Kotzel, on Lake Balaton, who became an enthusiastic admirer of the brothers' work and confided fifty young men to him for training.

Since it was obviously undesirable, if not impossible, for Constantine and Methodius to have their disciples ordained by the bishops of Passau or Salzburg, they decided, after three years of missionary activity, to journey to Rome, where they could obtain the endorsement of Pope Nicholas I. The brothers were by no means hostile to the Pope; on the contrary, in common with numerous other Byzantine ecclesiastics of their day, they regarded the Bishop of Rome not only as the patriarch of the West but also as the supreme head of the Church. News of their arrival in Venice inspired a special invitation from Pope Nicholas to wait upon him, but before they left Venice he died in November 867 and was succeeded a month later by Adrian II. Though the Frankish opposition to the Slavic liturgy had been transmitted to the Roman clergy, Adrian ordered the ordination of the candidates whom Constantine and Methodius presented, and authorized the use of the Slavic liturgy. Constantine survived his triumph but a few

000 months. Broken in health, he retired to an Italian monastery where he assumed the name of Cyril and died on February 4, 869.

175\* Meanwhile, in Pannonia, Prince Kotzel became worried over  
 795 the long absence of the young priests he had detailed for or-  
 793 dination. When he sent a special mission to inquire about them, the Pope dismissed Methodius and his followers with a letter addressed jointly to Rostislav, to the latter's nephew Svatopluk, and to Kotzel, stating that he was designating Methodius as an emissary not merely to Pannonia, but to Moravia as well, but, fearful of irritating the Frankish clergy, he momentarily abstained from naming Methodius Bishop of Pannonia, as Kotzel preferred, since this action would have detached Pannonia from the diocese of Salzburg. His hesitation was banished, however, by Rostislav's military successes against Louis the German in 869, which diminished the authority of the Frankish clergy, and also by the news that Boris of Bulgaria was turning from Rome to Byzantium. In order to block any further expansion of Byzantine influence and to tie the Danubian Slavs more closely to Rome, he thus consecrated Methodius as Archbishop of Pannonia and named him papal legate to all the Slavs.

175\* The success of this design was almost immediately com-  
 795 promised by unforeseen political developments. In 870, Rostislav was deposed by his nephew Svatopluk, who became a Frankish vassal. On his arrival in Moravia, Methodius was arrested and brought before a court comprising the bishops of Passau, Salzburg, and Freising, who professed total ignorance of his new episcopal status. Far from doing anything to protect Methodius, Svatopluk was actually present when Hermanarich, Bishop of Passau, struck the Greek bishop with his whip. Discovering, however, that he was merely the catspaw of the Franks, Svatopluk soon reversed his field and by 874 was independent. The curia meanwhile endeavored to ascertain what had happened to Methodius. The Bishop of Freising denied to

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Pope Adrian that he even knew him, but after Adrian's death in 872, his successor John VIII sent a special legate to Louis the German with orders suspending two of the offending bishops and directing the primate of Salzburg to release Methodius and to install him in his proper diocese. Unfortunately, however, John was obliged to placate the Germans, and compromised to the extent of forbidding Methodius the use of the Slavic liturgy, though he permitted preaching in the vernacular. 175\* 795 796

Since 867 events had moved rapidly in Constantinople itself. Basil I, the bold and able successor of Michael III, whom he had murdered, revived the Byzantine navy, drove the Arabs from the Adriatic, and gradually reestablished Greek ascendancy over the Croat tribes of the shoreline, who maintained their independence from the Frankish yoke that weighed upon their inland kindred, and therefore for the moment gravitated toward Byzantium. Basil thus secured not only the submission of the Serbs and the coastal tribes as far as Dalmatia, but also sent missionaries to baptize any remaining pagans. Dalmatia was then subjected in 878, and more missionaries accompanied the new Greek administration. Since the Bulgarians had been affiliated with Constantinople since 870, this date represents the high watermark of Byzantine influence in the Balkans. In 879, however, the Grecophile Croat princes were opposed by a revolt which brought the Dalmatian coastal area once more into the Roman sphere. This development defined the future limits of Byzantine influence. It remained dominant in Serbia and on the Croat coast as far as Dalmatia, as well as among the Slavs in Bulgaria, Thrace, and the Greek peninsula. 175\*

In connection with the Serbs, we should note here that the faith reached them from two directions. The territory south of Pannonia and west of the Balkan Morava River, which joins the Danube east of Belgrade, was evangelized by Roman priests from the coast as early as the eighth century. On the other hand, the conversion of the Slavs in western Macedonia, 175\* 797



175\* whether Bulgarians or Serbs, proceeded from Salonika at approximately the same time, but was most intense during the reign of Basil I.

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175\* Methodius had not obeyed the Pope's injunction to abandon the Slavic liturgy but, when summoned to Rome in 879 to explain his position, was again victorious on even this point. John VIII, however, endeavored to conciliate Svatopluk, who had never been personally sympathetic toward Methodius, by naming as the latter's suffragan the Prince's favorite priest, one Wiching, who immediately took the side of the Frankish clergy and blocked Methodius at every turn. The Archbishop eventually decided to shift his activities further south, and in 881 set forth on a journey toward the valleys of the Drave and the Save, where he received an invitation from Basil I to visit Constantinople. The Patriarch Photius was, after all, an old friend, and the Emperor himself was well-informed of Methodius's activities in a frontier area not entirely alien to Greek interests.

Upon his return to his diocese Methodius at first concentrated his efforts on translating additional canonical books and ecclesiastical texts. Unfortunately for his pastoral work, however, John VIII was poisoned in 882, and under Stephen V hostile exchanges between Rome and Byzantium were resumed. Methodius himself died in April, 883, after designating as his successor Gorazd, his most capable disciple. Wiching, Methodius's old enemy, straightway renewed his intrigues and had no trouble in securing the favorable ear of a pope already irritated against Byzantium. Stephen V abandoned the Slavic liturgy altogether, Wiching's partisans secured the eternal exile of Gorazd and the other disciples of Methodius, and thus the work of twenty years in Moravia was wiped out.

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After the decision of Prince Boris of Bulgaria to accept conversion in 862, the next twenty years were marked by fruitless papal attempts to gain control of the Bulgarian church. In 870, indeed, the Eighth Oecumenical Council, under the influence of Basil I, had formally decided that the Bulgarian church was subject to the patriarchate of Constantinople, and

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Roman priests were thereafter excluded from the country. The archbishop of Bulgaria ranked next after the patriarch so that his diocese was practically autonomous, and Boris had good reason to resist all further Roman overtures and blandishments. Greek influence was therefore greatly intensified in Bulgaria, though the Byzantines were tactfully careful not to use their missionary activities for political ends. Besides Methodius, during his visit to Constantinople in 884, had given brilliant accounts of the results of his Moravian efforts in the vernacular. These reports aroused in both Basil I and Photius the idea that they could advance the good cause in Bulgaria by similar means, and a training school for Slavic priests was opened on the Bosphorus.

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After the elimination of Methodius's disciples from Moravia in 885, some of them were sold into slavery and were accidentally discovered by a Greek envoy in the slave market at Venice. They were immediately redeemed by the Byzantine envoy and taken to Constantinople where Basil hastened to assign them to Bulgarian charges. At the same time Clement and the other disciples of Methodius who had been put across the Danube arrived at the Bulgarian frontier fortress of Belgrade, whence they were sent on to Boris's court at Pliska, where they were cordially welcomed. At the moment the Greek court favored Slavic priests, hence there could be no objection to their employment in Bulgaria, even if the local Greek clergy viewed them with a somewhat jaundiced eye.

Unfortunately, however, Basil I died in the summer of 886, and Photius, the great patriarch and the friend of Constantine and Methodius, was supplanted by an insignificant successor. Boris therefore decided not to provoke the influential Greek clergy needlessly. He kept them at his court, but sent Clement and his associates to work among the people in Macedonia, which he hoped might develop into a promising stronghold of purely Slavic Christianity.

Boris abdicated in 889, and during the next thirty years, under the rule of his son Simeon, Bulgaria, despite varying

175\* fortunes, not only threw off even the vestiges of a Byzantine protectorate but also extended its domain far into Serbia. During this interval Clement's activity greatly expanded. He founded the great monastery of Saint Panteleimon at Okhrida, and on Simeon's accession he was consecrated a bishop. The legacy of Constantine and Methodius was thus preserved in all its wealth, to the great advantage of Bulgaria, which thus became a purely Slavic country with an autonomous church. Simeon was accordingly able to realize his father's ambition of proclaiming a Bulgarian patriarchate.

175\* Obviously the roots of the culture disseminated by the Bulgarian church, however nationalistic, were essentially Byzantine. Though a Slav by birth, Clement himself had been trained by Greek masters, and Simeon too was culturally so Hellenized as to be nicknamed the "half-Greek." Hence the literary productions of the Macedonian schools founded by Clement and his associates were, if not mere translations, usually slavish imitations of Greek texts. Simeon himself composed an anthology of texts compiled from Greek theologians. Though the influence of Byzantine letters during this epoch was limited to the theological and the liturgical sphere, it is of relatively enormous significance that at the end of the ninth century and the beginning of the tenth the Old Bulgarian language was being adopted for literary purposes under Greek influence, and that a large body of Slavic-speaking priests was being created who were capable of transmitting at least the ecclesiastical aspects of Greek culture in their own tongue. The mission of Constantine and Methodius thus bore fruit, not on the ground they themselves sowed, but on territory closer to Byzantium, so that the results of what their disciples accomplished in Bulgaria could be easily drawn upon seventy-five years later when a much more extensive field was opened with the conversion of the south Russian principality of Kiev.

175\* At the same time, the Slavic liturgy which had been proscribed in Moravia was also transmitted through Pannonia into Croatia, but in general the popes saw no reason to use it

# *Conversion and Religious Divisions*

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as an instrument once Byzantine encroachments were no longer feared, especially since the local bishops were liable to Roman influence, and the Slavic princes themselves were anxious to placate the romance-speaking populations of the wealthy coastal cities. But with the exception of Croatia, the work of Constantine and Methodius brought all the South Slavs and later the Eastern Slavs under the cultural aegis of Byzantium.

The Slovenes, the Czechs, and the Moravians had fallen, as we have seen, to the lot of Rome. While the Slovenes, by withdrawing southward from the Danube, were able to escape total absorption by the Germans, their Slavic kindred on the Baltic coast and in the interior of Germany faced infinitely more critical circumstances. The Saxon clergy were eager for landed possessions, and the easiest way to obtain them was by evangelizing the Transelbian Slavs, whose conversion would also pour tithes into their coffers. German expansion at the expense of the Western Slavs was most drastically pursued during the reign of Otto I (936-973). Beyond the Elbe a swarm of bishoprics arose, half houses of God, half fortresses. The Slavs became tributary as far as the Oder. They retained their landed possessions, but all unoccupied land was transferred from the Slavic chiefs to the German crown. Royal vassals were placed in the tribal centers to operate the administration, and bishoprics were established along the eastern border. Forcible conversion of the Slavic natives became the order of the day. Narrow as their margin of living was, the Slavic peasants were driven to rigorous abstention from labor on the numerous saints' days. The spiritual content of their conversion was actually so slight at this period that it is actually recorded how the Slavic peasants who were laboriously taught to say *Kyrie eleison* in the right places sullenly parroted it with like-sounding Slavic words which mean "in a crooked alder-bush." Indeed, the avarice and oppression of both clergy and nobles provoked violent outbreaks of resentment among the Transelbian Slavs in 982, 1018, and 1066, which cost many German lives and threw the colonizers back across the Elbe, so that it was not until the middle

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175\* of the twelfth century that German domination was reestablished between the Elbe and the Oder.  
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[99] The beginnings of the Polish state fall, as it happens, within the period characterized by German pressure on the Baltic Slavs during the reign of Otto I. About 963 the pagan Polish prince Mieszko I ruled over a realm east of the Oder and south of Pomerania and modern East Prussia, which included the middle and upper Vistula basin, stretching further southward to the Czech border at the Sudetens, and comprising most of Volhynia. The German Margrave Gero, whose territory included a good part of modern Saxony, subjugated the Slavic Lusatians (Liticians) and Milchanians of the upper Spree valley. These tribes extended eastward to the Oder and the Bober, and were thus in close contact with the western Polish peoples. At the same time, German penetration threatened Silesia southwest of the upper Oder, and in 979 the Margrave Odo even endeavored to force Mieszko to pay tribute on the area between the Oder and the War—the rivers (that is, roughly, between Frankfurt-Glogau and Posen). This expedition resulted in a German defeat, but the German menace had already induced Mieszko to improve his standing by affiliating himself with a Christian reigning family and to embrace the faith himself.

In spite of his previous record of polygamy, he married Dubravka (Bona), sister of the Czech prince Boleslav I, in 966, and was converted. The Polish bishopric of Posen was founded in 968. It was subject to the archdiocese of Magdeburg, and its first encumbent was a German cleric. Mieszko then made his submission to Otto in Quedlinburg on Easter Day, 973. After Otto I's death, German relations with Poland were more or less in abeyance until 984. Meanwhile Dubravka had died in 977, whereupon Mieszko married Oda, previously a nun, the daughter of the Margrave Thiedrich. Mieszko himself died in 992 as a faithful vassal of Otto III. His son and successor, Boleslav the Brave, maintained the same policy with such success that he won the respect of both Otto III and Pope Sylvester II

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(Gerbert d'Aurillac). Otto's temperament was singularly open to foreigners, and he conceived an intense regard for Boleslav which the latter was not beyond exploiting. Knowing that Otto's friend Adalbert, former Bishop of Prague, had been slain on a missionary journey to the Prussians in 999, Boleslav successfully endeavored to recover his relics. Otto was thus induced the next year to make a pilgrimage to Gnesen, where they were preserved. He relieved Boleslav of the previous tribute to the empire, made Gnesen an archbishopric, and transferred Posen to the archdiocese of Mainz. Polish bishoprics dependent on Gnesen were also set up in Breslau, Krakow, and Kolberg (Pomerania). Though he could not entirely throw off German vassalage, Boleslav thus made the Polish church practically independent of German influence.

During the ninth century ambitious Vikings from Sweden settled in the Slavic trading centers on the Russian water courses, established themselves as a ruling class, and organized two strong points at Novgorod and Kiev at either extremity of the great trade route from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Extending its authority over neighboring tribes and cities, Kiev in the tenth century became a rising principality largely supported by commerce. Its princes raided the shores of the Black Sea, and its commercial contacts with Byzantium were regulated by extant treaties as early as 907. One Kievan prince even ventured to attack Constantinople in 941. Another member of the ruling house, the Princess Olga (she was of pure Swedish blood), visited Constantinople and was converted in 957. Though there were some Christians in Kiev from that early date, her son Sviatoslav refused to change his faith. During his campaigns of 967-971 in Bulgaria, he seriously menaced the Greek capital. But his son Vladimir was destined to play an even more conspicuous role in Byzantine diplomatic and dynastic history.

Vladimir succeeded to the principate in 977. He had extensive Scandinavian connections, and was highly successful in subjecting Slavic tribes of the periphery. He was in close con-

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175<sup>th</sup> contact with the Poles, and among his concubines were several  
 ●795 Christian girls of either Greek or Slavic blood. He was not with-  
 797 out interest in religion as such, having staged a sort of pagan  
 revival in Kiev at the opening of his reign. There is some likeli-  
 hood that frequent exchanges with Byzantium had caused him  
 to entertain the idea of conversion before 987, but in that year  
 an unusual combination of circumstances pushed him toward  
 a decision.

John Tzimiskes, one of the greatest of Byzantine generals and  
 victor over Vladimir's father Sviatoslav in Bulgaria, had died  
 in 976 after reigning as emperor of Byzantium for six years.  
 He was succeeded on the throne by two youthful sovereigns,  
 Basil II and Constantine. Since their prestige was slight, their  
 authority was almost immediately menaced by a military re-  
 volt, the leader of which even occupied Scutari, opposite Con-  
 stantinople. As soon as the revolt broke out, Basil entered into  
 correspondence with Vladimir in the hope of winning an alli-  
 ance and auxiliary troops. Vladimir was disinclined to furnish  
 this aid without commensurate reward, and coupled with his  
 assent the condition that the emperors should give him their  
 sister Anna in marriage. Up to this point Byzantine sovereigns  
 had normally been chary of marrying their female relations to  
 alien princes. Constantine Porphyrogenitus had laid down the  
 principle twenty-five years before that no Byzantine princess  
 should marry a foreign potentate unless he were baptized. The  
 German emperor Otto I had vainly negotiated in behalf of  
 his son for the hand of the emperors' sister whom Vladimir  
 now sought. But the situation of the empire was too critical to  
 brook long delay, and the emperors consented to the marriage  
 provided Vladimir would accept conversion.

The Prince of Kiev then supplied six thousand troops who  
 helped to repress the rebellion during the summer of 988. But  
 once the fortunes of the emperors began to rise, they showed  
 manifest reluctance to execute the part of the bargain which  
 concerned the Princess Anna. Vladimir, for his part, had taken  
 this stipulation very seriously and intended it should be en-

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forced. So while his troops were still assisting the Byzantines during the summer of 989, he besieged and captured the Greek city of Chersonesus on the western Crimean coast about three miles south of modern Sevastopol, after which he sent envoys to Constantinople with the warning that if the princess were not sent to meet him he would attack the capital. Basil and Constantine were thus induced to carry out their share of the contract, and Anna departed tearfully with a numerous suite for Chersonesus, where Vladimir's baptism and his marriage were duly solemnized.

After restoring Chersonesus to the Greeks, Vladimir returned to Kiev accompanied by the priests in Anna's entourage, and there proceeded to convert his subjects with the same forthright energy he showed in other crises. He caused the local idols to be overthrown, and the local population was subjected to wholesale baptism in the Dnieper river which flows past the city. As conversion progressed, the principate was divided into eight eparchies, each under a bishop. During the next century, however, Christianity spread rather slowly, as is indicated by outbreaks of paganism fifty and even eighty years later under the leadership of local shamans.

The conversion of the masses was to some extent accelerated by a facile syncretism which assimilated the figures of Christian belief to the chief dieties of the rudimentary pagan Slavic cult. Perun the thunderer was identified with the prophet Elijah in his chariot of fire, and it was also an easy step from belief in Svarog, the god of fire, and in his son Dazhbog, the life-giving solar orb, to an elementary conception of Almighty God the Father and the Son, the light of the world and of truth. The pagan Slavs' conceptions of an omnipotent multitude of benign or hostile supernatural beings were satisfied by the Christian notions of the Virgin, of saints, and of devils. Conversion also provided the upper classes with a general basic philosophy or *Weltanschauung* and with abundant ritual answers to their common human speculations. It likewise endowed them with an ideal of conduct which, though hardly

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While some ingenious theories to the contrary have been expounded, the fact remains that Byzantine relations with Bulgaria were constantly hostile from Vladimir's conversion to his death in 1015. Basil II would thus hardly have attached to an enemy state the young church founded by his brother-in-law. There is therefore no motive for believing that the Russian church at its foundation was other than an eparchy of the Byzantine patriarchate, even if we admit the contention that there was no metropolitanate in Russia during Vladimir's lifetime. In the transmission of Slavic liturgical and theological texts at this period the mediation of Constantinople was inevitable, and the priests at Vladimir's disposal must have likewise been chiefly Greeks, some of whom possessed a smattering of Bulgarian from work in Bulgaria itself or, like the proto-apostles Constantine and Methodius, from their contacts in the northern and western marches of the Byzantine Empire.

That Vladimir assimilated certain intellectual interests along with the faith is indicated by his insistence upon some degree of education among the children of his followers. The *Primary Chronicle* reports:

*He took the children of the best families and sent them for instruction in book learning. The mothers of these children wept bitterly over them, for they were not yet strong in faith, but mourned as for the dead.*

It is not clear whether Vladimir intended that these youths should be trained as priests or as civil servants, but from the facts that within the next fifty years educated Russian priests come to the fore and that extensive reference is made in the sources to the culture of Vladimir's son and successor Yaroslav the Wise, it is fair to suppose that Vladimir had his eye on both professions. In Constantinople at the close of the tenth century interest in higher education was restricted by the general attention to military problems and conquest, so that book learning was primarily a matter of personal and private

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Kiev in 1240. No remnant of it now survives except the ruins of its foundations. 175\*  
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In Vladimir's day the clergy rapidly assumed a place among the ruling class. Apart from introducing new notions of judicial procedure derived from the Greek *Nomokanon*, the early clergy also undertook to advise Vladimir on affairs of state and local policy. In 992 the bishops advised the substitution of corporal punishment for fines in order to suppress brigandage and similarly suggested that the proceeds of fines in other cases should be spent on military equipment for defense against the menacing nomads. The ecclesiastical courts also assumed jurisdiction over numerous social problems and offenses which took new significance in the light of the Christian moral code: bigamy, divorce, heresy, sacrilege, witchcraft, and adultery. Vladimir thus tolerated the fusion of church and state on the basis of contemporary Byzantine usage. 175\*  
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By the process of conversion among the various Slavic groups, the bases of cultural and political differentiation were thus laid before the year 1000. Exposed to Christian influences since the seventh century, the Slovenes were converted by Bavarian clergy, and after their absorption into the Carolingian empire in 788, remained until the first World War in submission to one German state or another. The Croats, though in contact with the mission of Constantine and Methodius, reverted to Rome after the disciples of Methodius were expelled from Moravia, and have come down through the ages as Catholics, whatever their political allegiance. The Slavs along the Elbe and the Baltic were subjected to the most violent political and religious pressure from Saxon priests and nobles with the result that, despite heroic revolts, they were slowly pushed back toward the former Polish frontier. The Byzantine influence in Moravia lasted but a quarter of a century before the work of the proto-apostles, Constantine and Methodius collapsed, and the Moravians, like the Czechs, remained under the pastoral care of bishops of the Roman rite. Though the 175\*  
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175<sup>2</sup> spirit of Bohemian individualism rose again during the Hussite  
● 795 Wars of the early fifteenth century, and was not extinguished  
even after the accession of the Hapsburgs in 1526, in our own  
time, after triumph and defeat, it will (we hope) rise to play a  
worthy role in a better world.

The Poles have never departed from the faith that Mieszko  
I brought them in 963, and their whole cultural evolution is  
intimately dependent upon the civilizing mission of the Roman  
Church; if ever their faith was firm, they need it doubly now.  
The Serbs and Bulgarians were ecclesiastically dependent from  
the ninth century on Byzantium, and we have seen how the  
intellectual nationalism of Boris and Simeon built up a treas-  
ury of native Slavic culture derived from Byzantine sources.  
Upon this treasury the Russian Church drew as soon as it was  
founded, and without Simeon's policy of ecclesiastical auton-  
omy the rapid advance of medieval Russian culture would  
have been greatly retarded. After the fall of Byzantium before  
the Turks in 1453, Russia remained the sole great repository  
of Byzantine and Greek Orthodox religious tradition until  
thirty years ago.

175\* was the husband of a Greek princess, and the son of this union  
 643 eventually became the consort of Gytha, daughter of the Saxon  
 631 Harold who fell at Hastings in 1066. Kiev was thus united  
 with contemporary European states by a series of dynastic  
 alliances foreshadowing the customs of modern times.

175\* Yet for all his power and wealth, Yaroslav governed by the  
 643 same simple mechanism that had prevailed under Vladimir.  
 The prince won his position by force and maintained it by per-  
 sonal supremacy, supported by Varangian mercenaries recruited  
 from Scandinavia whenever domestic levies proved insufficient  
 or disloyal, and consulting with his chief military aides, with  
 the city elders, or with church dignitaries on matters of general

[671] policy. Yaroslav began the codification of customary civil and  
 ecclesiastical law, encouraged both translations and original

• [795] literature, and endeavored without success to emancipate the  
 Russian Church from the Byzantine patriarchate. By his crush-  
 ing victory over the nomad Pechenegs before the walls of Kiev  
 in 1036, he made the marches of his principality safe for thirty-  
 five years.

175\* Beside rebuilding his father's Church of the Tithe after it  
 643 was damaged by fire in 1017, he carried out a large-scale con-  
 346 struction program which made Kiev one of the most notable  
 532 medieval cities. His great cathedral of Saint Sophia in Kiev,  
 with its five apses and thirteen cupolas, still contains the largest  
 extant yardage of eleventh-century Byzantine frescoes and a  
 series of remarkably preserved mosaics of impressive beauty.  
 This is the one medieval Russian church which has been ex-  
 haustively studied by American archaeologists in coöperation  
 with native Russian colleagues.

175\* The underlying weakness of the Kievan principality lay in  
 643 the fact that its stability was assured only by the prestige and  
 186 ability of the ruling prince. There was as yet no sentiment of  
 631 solidarity, national unity, and group interest which guaranteed  
 that the whole system would not be overthrown by some am-  
 bitious and resolute rival from among the kindred princes in  
 outlying cities loosely subject to the authority of the prince of  
 Kiev and envious of his power and wealth.



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earlier, and is reflected in the increased importance of the more remote northeastern domains of Rostov, Suzdal, and Murom, between the Oka and the Volga where the nomad menace did not reach. <sup>175\*</sup>  
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While the inarticulate masses bore the brunt of the crisis, the wealth of the ruling class was for the moment not impaired, but rather enhanced. As long as the princes and their retainers were prosperous, the wealth of the Church also increased by grants and gifts. Monasteries multiplied and new churches were erected. Contact with Byzantium was still preserved. Through the expansion of the hierarchy under Greek guidance and example, the intellectual progress initiated by Yaroslav was intensified. To be sure, this culture remained aristocratic and ecclesiastical, but in this respect it hardly differed from the contemporary civilization of Western Europe, even though deprived of the continuity of classical tradition which lay at the root of the culture developed under the aegis of Rome. Marital alliances with German, Hungarian, and Polish princely families show at the same time that the Russian princes attached but slight importance to differences between the Eastern and Western Churches even after the schism of 1054. <sup>175\*</sup>  
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<sup>795</sup> ●

No sooner had Vladimir Monomach died in 1125 when strife among the princes became rife once more. Competition for the control of Novgorod developed between the prince of Kiev and Monomach's son George whose domain lay at Suzdal in the northeast. Rival princes sacked and plundered one another's domains. One unpopular prince was even lynched by the angry Kievan populace. In 1149, Prince George captured Kiev himself, thus proving the vitality and resources of the northeastern area, but was unable to hold the metropolis permanently before 1155. When George died in 1160, however, the city had been fought over so constantly in the previous thirty years that practically all its dependent territory had been nipped off by neighboring principalities and it had been stripped of every element of its political prestige. Hence the possession of Kiev no longer conferred upon the ruling prince <sup>175\*</sup>  
<sup>721</sup>  
<sup>631</sup>

*German and Slav*

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Bohemia. Sometimes a Bohemian village received so many German colonists that it was practically changed into a German settlement. Czech towns frequently were obliged to alter their traditional character and adopt German usages. The nobles began to resurvey and repartition the lands attached to these villages, forcing the Czech peasants to pay rent and to assume all obligations applied to the newer settlers. The Czechs were obliged to accept these innovations for fear of being dispossessed in favor of the German newcomers, and this process continued until the early fifteenth century and the period of the Hussite Wars. 175\*

The Germanization of Bohemia progressed most rapidly after the year 1200. King Václav (Wenceslas) I was a great friend of the German colonists, even to the point of driving the Czech peasants out of his native town and settling it with Germans, and his example was eagerly followed by the Bohemian nobility. It even became the custom to rechristen local castles with German names and to give new ones such names to start with, till the country bristled with Löwenbergs, Steinbergs, Rosenbergs, and Rosenthals. New monasteries were headed by German abbots who systematically forgot the Old Slavonic liturgy and the great tradition of Methodius, though he was buried at Velehrad, from 1201 the site of a Cistercian house. Among the German militant orders, the Knights of St. John were permitted to settle German colonists anywhere upon their lands. These settlers were exempt from local laws and freed from local duties and obligations. Both Templars and Hospitallers had established churches at Prague before 1255. About the same period, Dominicans and Franciscans also founded their first Bohemian houses, including both German and Italian friars. The German colony at Prague was the oldest and richest foreign group within the country, since all other German settlements were either in rural districts or in the mountainous mining regions. 177

The favors extended to the Germans at Prague were not dictated by sentiment but by practical interests, since they

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648 will be founded—because it is in the force of events, because the peoples long for it, because it is the best possible solution to the present difficulties, and because, if it were not founded, these countries would fall a sure prey to Russia; Panslavism would be established in their place'. These few sentences—prophetic ones, moreover—provide the clue to all Serbian diplomatic thought, whether declared or understood, up to the 1914 War. The majority of the statesmen in Belgrade were partisans of a Russophile policy, with the exception of the old-time Progressists, and even so, one of their leaders, Stefan Novakovich, kept his confidence in the Tsarist Government. But, with these men, a Russophile policy never meant a Russian policy. We shall have defined the historical 'Russophilia' of the Balkan States, if we say that it always postulated the greatness of Russia, and was bounded by the determination to eliminate that country from internal affairs of the Peninsula.

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• 795 Yugoslav Catholics were inclined to be prejudiced in favour of Russia; this was due, on the one hand, to their geographical situation, beyond the reach of Russian ambitions, and, on the other, to the fact that their Catholicism was much less exclusivist than that of Poland, for instance. No doubt this intellectual liberty must be attributed to an instinctive reaction against the policy of the Vatican, which was then axed on Austria-Hungary, i.e., on the two countries whose yoke the Yugoslavs aspired to shake off. The majority of the Croat and Slovene thinkers and poets of the nineteenth century were inspired by Slav traditions; the Illyrian movement was, in their countries, the starting-point of the national Renaissance. But the role of the Catholic clergy in this renaissance, and its connections with Orthodox Russia, is certainly one of the most decisive manifestations of that 'Slavonic conscience' which the politicians of St. Petersburg believed to be the attribute of the Orthodox Slavs. In Slovenia the priest, Jean Krek, the instigator of the Co-operative movement, and later on, Abbé Anton Korochets; in Croatia Bishop Strossmayer and Canon Ratski, were not only apostles of Slav solidarity, they had frequent contacts with the Russians. Strossmayer, who was one of the contrivers of Yugoslav unity, had not only been one of the opponents of the Vatican Council; he protested vigorously against the Holy See's anti-Russian attitude at the time of the 1877 War.

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Turkish journalist) some people in Eastern Europe who would like to return to the old policy of oppression of the Slavonic peoples. . . . The new friendship among these peoples, related to each other and bound by century-old ties of a common culture, was being tempered in the crucible of the war of liberation. . . . Their *rapprochement* would displease none but those who dreamed of seeing them dominated once again'.

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The Orlemanski affair has shown us an attempt at Slav solidarity in the domain of religious tolerance. In the same order of things, but this time in connection with the Orthodox Slavs, we cannot omit to mention the deep impression produced by the restoration of juridical personality to the Russian Orthodox Church (September, 1943) and the elevation of the Metropolitan Serge to the office of Patriarch, abolished in 1721 by Peter the Great and which enjoyed a brief restoration in 1917. With its hundred and fifty million followers, the Orthodox community, placed at the cross-roads of the war, was undergoing one of the most tragic crises in its history. Its suffering was all the more serious, inasmuch as the Orthodox Churches are organised on national lines, in contrast to the hierarchical unity of Roman Catholicism. These churches are bound together by identical doctrine and canons. But, in the course of the centuries, they have progressively relaxed the bonds of dependence which used to attach them to the Œcumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Religious autonomy has advanced side by side with the emancipation of the nationalities. In restoring the rights of the Church, Stalin not only indicated his desire to reawaken the traditions of Russian national life, within the framework of a social renovation; he also tightened the historic bonds between his country and the Balkan nations of the Orthodox religion, thus reinforcing, by new spiritual affinities, sympathies founded on community of race, of oppression, and of destiny.

Germany tried to foil this policy by summoning to Vienna, on November 5, under the presidency of the Metropolitan of Belgrade, the Orthodox prelates adhering to the Axis cause, and especially the Metropolitans of Berlin and of Paris, who declared the election of the new Patriarch to be null and void. This demonstration was of no effect; the vast majority of the Serbian, Rumanian, Greek and Bulgarian hierarchies either had nothing



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795 to do with the protesting prelates,<sup>11</sup> or openly dissociated themselves from their attitude.

771 By way of retort, the first number of the *Moscow Patriarchy*  
626 published a message from the Council of Russian Bishops, assembled for the election, inviting Christians to pray for the victory of the Red Army and the fulfilment of the scriptural text invoked by Alexander Nevsky: 'He who strikes with the sword shall perish by the sword'. On September 8, this same Council had excommunicated 'as adversaries of the Cross of the Lord, all who have been guilty of treason to the common cause of the Church and gone over to Fascism'; the bishops and clergy guilty on this head were removed from their sacred office.

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186\* To conclude, the only obstacles to a general reconciliation  
563 of the Slavonic peoples came from the Poles. To summarise here the vicissitudes of Soviet-Polish relations since the pact of December, 1941, would mean not only relating the most stormy chapter in the Allies' war diplomacy, but also recalling the relations of the various groups among the Polish exiles, the antagonism between the London Committee and that of Lublin, the frontier problem, and also the perhaps more tragic problem of the political, religious, and social concepts on the basis of which the Polish State was to be re-born. Once again it was made very clear that Poland occupied a place apart on the map of the Slavonic world, and formed an obstacle to the realisation of full Slav solidarity.

727 Like the other Slavonic States, however, she had been caught  
177 up in the advance of the Russian armies sweeping across Eastern Europe—an onrush which settled the fate of the Slav nations, with or without their consent, as a consequence of their liberation. For three or four years Germany had been the second Slavonic power in the world. She had imposed on her Serbian, Croatian, Slovak, and Bulgarian satellites not only the horrors of the occupation, but also ideologies strongly opposed to their temperaments and their history; an impersonal and tyrannical idea of the State, a 'New Order' which was nothing but a hypocritical subjection, anti-Semitism which—with the exceptions of Poland and Imperial Russia—the Slavonic nations had always regarded with horror. When the collapse came, all these nations turned

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<sup>11</sup> Among these, however, we must include the head of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Argentine.

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And, on August 15, Warsaw and Russia signed a treaty covering the frontier-delimitation of the two States, and war damages. M. Osobka-Morawski welcomed the agreements, which restored to Poland her 'historic frontiers' on the Neisse, the Oder, and the Baltic shore. For his part, M. Stanczyk, Minister of Labour, addressing the Polish troops, endeavoured to dispel their hesitation: 'The new Poland is free and independent. Naturally, in the event of a fresh aggression, Russia would be our ally, but the fact that her line of defence coincides with our western frontier has nothing to do with our independence. If you return you will find, it is true, plenty of work—but you will be working for Poland. That is why I advise you to return as soon as possible'.

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In October, 1945, the President of the Polish National Council, Borisław Bierut, still estimated at six million—a quarter of the total population—the number of Poles remaining outside the national territory. This was a major obstacle to the carrying out of the undertaking given in respect of an early and conclusive election.

But it was not to be doubted that many Poles would, once more, prefer exile to returning to a country whose independence was hopelessly mortgaged.

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Her geographical position, which condemned Poland to be dominated either by Germany or by Russia, had just fixed her destiny in the East. For a long time anti-Russian (and, since 1920, anti-Sovietic) feeling and ideas had been for Poland a political trend—and, even more, an axiom of international ethics. They had been considered as the fundamental criteria of patriotism—a sort of moral urge, the preliminary condition for the exercise of civic rights.

So that a new era was opening in the history of the Polish people. The previous one was called 'romantic', the present one being designated 'realistic'. But there was a deep-seated uneasiness in the soul of this nation, which—as her history has a hundred times borne witness—has never hesitated to rush into a catastrophe rather than restrain the impulses of a very sensitive patriotism.

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Poland's strong attachment to the Catholic Faith also opened up possible difficulties. It was natural that the partisans of an *entente* with Russia should be recruited in extreme-Leftist and

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atheistic circles. But the international crisis which swept the country was complicated by a religious crisis. This became evident when the Council of Ministers decided, on September 17, to denounce the Concordat, accusing the Vatican of having violated its clauses by the publication, during the occupation, of laws contrary to its engagements (an allusion to the nomination of bishops of German nationality in Posnania).

Poland had lost the liberty of choice which, for so long, had enabled her to seek her equilibrium between the Teutonic and the Russian world. Willy-nilly, she had to accustom herself to the new state of affairs; but she brought to the situation the germ of serious civil discord. And her exiles, maintaining a more than century-old tradition, were to keep alive, especially in Anglo-American and in Catholic circles, an atmosphere of opposition—not to mention the clandestine resistance, all the centres of which were not extinct in Poland itself. Our grandchildren will talk of the 'Polish Question' just as our grandparents used to do.

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In her foreign policy Bulgaria has a 'spare ideology' which enables her to reverse her international situation according to whether she is at peace or at war. Thus she periodically takes her stand beside the Power which seems able to help her to realise her territorial aspirations. This is the effect of that 'Macedonian psychosis' of which we have spoken. But her evil genius has invariably inspired her to 'back the wrong horse'.

In the Second World War, she passed through three phases.

Feeling sure that Germany was invincible, but profiting by her previous disappointments, she first tried to gain Hitler's support at the lowest possible price. This was the period of so-called 'passive belligerency', limited to platonic manifestations—adhesion to the Tripartite Pact and to the anti-Comintern Pact.

But the Axis soon saw through this ruse. In April, 1941, it allowed Bulgaria to settle in Western Macedonia (Serbia) and in Eastern Macedonia (Greece). In return, it expected its troops to have right of passage through and of quartering in Bulgarian territory. Such was the *leit-motiv* of the three interviews which took place between Hitler and King Boris, between March, 1941,

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the resurrection of Montenegro, a country of 200,000 inhabitants, 578 which had disappeared since 1918, and of Bosnia, which had 643 not been heard of in history since the Middle Ages, in keeping with the ideas of a 'new world' that were current in Tito's circle? And had not Tito himself, by liberating atomic nationalisms, super-Balkanised his country at a time when means of communication were suppressing distances—in other words, had he not inaugurated a policy which was opposed to history, progress, and common sense, in order to realise the midsummer night's dream of a Slavophile of the 'Forties'?

The federal régime, it will be said, has representatives in 000 Europe—Switzerland, Russia, Austria. But Switzerland has maturity, Russia has extent, Austria has an historical and cultural homogeneity to safeguard its unity.

Was not the Yugoslav community in imminent danger from 795 • this 'State power' given to regions hitherto divided by so many memories? The Croats used to oppose the Serbs in religious matters. Between the two wars, rivalry between Catholics and Orthodox had subsided somewhat. But the elections in Austria and Hungary showed that, after the liberation, the attachment of the populations of Central Europe to the Roman Church had lost none of its force. Croatia—*antemurale Christianitatis*—could not escape this deeply-rooted tendency, still less at a time when Russia, the protectress of the Yugoslav State, reaffirmed the Orthodox tradition on which her relations with the Serbs had formerly been based. How was it possible not to see in this renewal of religious antagonism between Belgrade and Zagreb a threat of secession?

In Yugoslavia the Crown used to be (as in Belgium) the link 642 175 between different peoples, traditions, and trends. On November 29, 1945, obedient to Tito's watchword, the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly, composed of the Union Assembly and the Assembly of the Nationalities, proclaimed the Federative Republic. It deposed and condemned to exile the dynasty of the Karageorgevich.

This vote was the logical conclusion of the elections and also—it must be admitted—of the errors of the young King. The latter raised a protest which was greeted, in London circles, with more sympathy than encouragement. The fate of the monarchy in Yugoslavia seemed, indeed, to be definitely settled.



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create an indissoluble union of Slavs which will be a bulwark against the repetition of catastrophes similar to that of 1941'.<sup>\*</sup>

On October 2, addressing a group of Polish journalists, Tito used the expression 'Slavonic era'. But this expression must be understood in a constructive, not an imperialist sense. 'United spiritually, the Slavs form a barrier against medieval [sic] ideas directed against culture and humanity. . . . The Slavs will bring peace and security to Europe'.

There were the same oratorical outpourings among the Bulgars. Kimon Gheorgiev's programme included 'a cordial friendship with the Soviet Union and an eternal friendship with the sister nation of Russia'. Nikolov, President of the Slav Committee in Sofia, also protested against the legend of Slavonic imperialism, but announced a 'union of the Slavonic peoples for the protection of their liberty and of their independence'.

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In the same spirit the Bulgars, walking hand in hand with Tito's Yugoslavia, affected an ostentatiously detached attitude to the question of Macedonia. They abolished the schism caused by the Exarchate, which had been created solely for the purpose of propaganda on behalf of annexation. Formerly the Macedonians were divided into Orthodox (Serbs) and Exarchists (Bulgars). Once this distinction was abolished, Bulgaria could, according to international circumstances, proclaim her disinterestedness or extend her claims to Macedonia.

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The Slavonic Governments backed one another's reciprocal claims. Marshal Tito approved the Czech policy with regard to the Hungarian minorities; Poland and Czechoslovakia handed to the London Conference notes supporting the Yugoslav territorial claims, which ran counter to those of Italy. Bulgars and Yugoslavs conducted a joint campaign against Greece regarding Aegean Macedonia.

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There was another manifestation of this general fraternisation. A Slav Congress was held in Bratislava in July, 1945. It passed a motion favouring the conclusion of a regional pact of friendship and mutual aid among all the Slavonic nations. The speakers indulged in striking forecasts of the possible effect, in international life, of a bloc of 205 million Slavs, i.e., one-third of the total population of Europe, covering two-thirds of its surface.

\* Speech made at Bela Turka on July 8.

## Chapter Seven

### ORTHODOXY AND PANSLAVISM

**I**N the renewal of the spirit of Slavonic solidarity an <sup>795</sup> important place must be attributed to the action of <sup>797</sup> Orthodoxy. <sup>185</sup>

The Muscovite Patriarchate, almost as soon as it was recon-<sup>659</sup>stituted on new juridical bases and assured of the Kremlin's support, set out to reconquer the communities who had relaxed their ties as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution, thereby renewing a Russian tradition which dates from Ivan III. The spiritual object of this pacific crusade was to restore union and harmony to the Orthodox or 'Pravoslav' world. But its political objective, though not openly avowed, was none the less obvious; the Moscow Government sought to extend its influence by having recourse to the 'armour of light' of which the Apostle speaks.

This campaign met with no canonical obstacle, since, among the Pravoslavs, there is no primacy of jurisdiction. But it *did* meet with resistance from the autocephalous 'national' tendencies of the various Orthodox Churches—tendencies which had been affirmed in the States created or enlarged by the First World War and in which the hierarchy had seized the opportunity of breaking away from the spiritual control of the Phanar (Constantinople Patriarchate).

But the weight of Soviet power enabled the Russian clergy easily to overcome the prejudices felt by the national Churches against any moral control exercised outside their State frontiers. For this purpose the clergy borrowed their arguments from the Muscovite temporal power, that is to say, they posed as champions of proletarian emancipation, and exploited the Orthodox Slavs' old prejudices against the Catholic Church. Whilst the Patriarch Alexis visited the Christian communities of the Middle East to restore the 'primacy of honour' of the Russian Church in the Orthodox Pentarchy (Moscow, Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, Jerusalem), the Metropolitan Alexis of Juroslav went to the United States to try to rally the section of Orthodox emigrants who resisted the authority of the Patriarch of Moscow.

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But it goes without saying that it was upon the Churches of the Balkan States that Muscovite influence was exercised most directly and decisively. In Yugoslavia the hierarchy created at Sremski Karlovtsi by Russian exiles, and which Mgr. Antoine, ex-Archbishop of Kiev, had organised immediately after the First World War, was dissolved and had to go into exile. A Russian delegation, presided over by the Metropolitan Serge of Odessa, went to present a mitre to Joseph, Metropolitan of Serbia, in February, 1946. The real object of this mission, which spent a month in Belgrade, was to define the future relations between the Yugoslav Church and the Muscovite Church.

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Then arose the case—a rather complicated one, it must be confessed—of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch, Mgr. Gavriilo. The latter had been accused by the Germans of having hidden part of the Crown treasure; he was interned, then taken to Dachau. When the Allies occupied Bavaria, he preferred retirement to Italy to a return to his country, where he was being begged to resume his duties. He adopted an attitude of opposition towards the régime established by Marshal Tito, as shown by his pastoral letter of Easter, 1946. The Serbian Orthodox Church had been rather badly treated by this régime, for she had been deprived of the education of the young, religious marriage had been declared invalid in law, and she had lost most of her property. It is said that it was under the influence of the Russian clergy that her Metropolitans invited the Patriarch to return. He did, in fact, return on November 14, 1946, and had an interview with Tito, during which 'all misunderstandings were cleared up'. And, as proof of this, at the Slav Congress in Belgrade on December 11, he made a speech in which, after having recalled the sacrifices made for the 'safeguarding of truth, the application of justice, and the defence of liberty', he manifested his joy at finding that the Slavonic peoples 'sorely tried by the bitter experience of their recent and remote past, were expending all their energy in their spiritual unity'. 'Slav solidarity', he concluded, 'is manifested, today more than ever, with the help of our mother, Russia, and of Generalissimo Stalin; it is the surest guarantee of the development of the Slavonic peoples'.

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In Bulgaria the clergy, after seventy-five years of schism, returned to nominal obedience to the Patriarchate of Con-

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stantinople, in agreement with the Muscovite hierarchy. The thousandth anniversary of the death of the anchorite, Saint John of Rila, restorer of Bulgarian monastic life, was the occasion, in May, 1946, of impressive solemnities which were attended by the Patriarch Alexis. It was the second time in ten centuries that the head of the Russian Church had visited the monastery. He officiated in person. The head of the Communist Party, George Dimitrov, took the opportunity of reminding the Bulgarian clergy that they should no longer look back towards the fallen régime:—

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'Today we can ask that our Church shall remain faithful to her millennial traditions and become, in fact, a Republican Church, by ceasing to render homage to the dynasty and the monarchs who have betrayed the Bulgarian nation. Let our Fathers in the Holy Synod and all honest servants of the Church understand that today we are living in new times, that they must on no account thwart the aspirations of the people, and that they may take example from the chiefs of the Russian Orthodox Church'.

We can fully understand this warning only if we visualise the state of latent tension existing in the relations between the Church and the Bulgarian State since the liberation. It had shown itself, since the month of January, 1946, in a protest from the Exarch, Mgr. Stephan, against the prohibition of religious instruction in the schools. Since the new Constitution provided for the separation of the Churches and the State, the Bulgarian Holy Synod announced in December, 1946, that, while remaining hostile to this separation, it would nevertheless accept it if the Charter surrounded the exercise of the Church's spiritual mission with juridical guarantees. Moreover, it demanded that lay instruction should be neither anti-religious nor anti-Christian, but strictly neutral.

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At the same time, in order to create conditions facilitating adaptation to the new state of affairs, it announced a programme of reforms destined to 'democratise' the internal régime of the Church and to bring its principles more in line with those of popular power.

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So that, in Bulgaria, the separation did not appear as persecution; it was manifested rather by a strengthening of the autocephalous character of the Church, too closely bound up

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659 with Bulgarian national life to be neglected by the new régime, which will continue to subsidise it, and counts upon its co-operation in rallying the masses; in which, moreover, it is assured of the goodwill of Mgr. Stephan and his clergy. On August 28, at the Bachkovo pilgrimage, Mgr. Cyrille, Metropolitan of Plovdiv, made a speech urging the faithful to vote, at the referendum, for the Republic and against 'the abhorred monarchy, whose role', he said, 'has been as fatal in the history of the country as in that of the Church'.

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Whereas, in the Balkan countries, the religious problem lay in getting the clergy to forget that they had, for some centuries, been the support of the monarchical institution, it had a quite different aspect among the Western Slavs, where the problem was, first and foremost, the liquidation of Uniatism.

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As the reader will know, the 'Act of Union' (hence the word 'Uniat') was concluded three and a half centuries ago, in 1596, at Brest-Litowsk, where the Metropolitan of Kiev acclaimed the renewal with Rome of the Union of Florence. As a result, since that date there had been flourishing communities 'of the Oriental rite', which recognised Papal supremacy while keeping their national liturgy and their discipline—which, among other regulations, permits (as the Orthodox Church does) the clergy to marry. These communities today number in all about two million followers, especially in territories formerly incorporated in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

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Uniatism had always been regarded by the Russians as a 'turning movement' on the part of the Roman Catholic Church, supported first by Poland, then by Austria-Hungary, to detach the Orthodox from their traditional faith. Urban VII's apostrophe: 'Ruthenians, the East will be conquered by you!' has obsessed the Muscovite Church, which has never ceased to endeavour to recapture its positions.

After the fall of the Tsarist régime this Church's efforts were paralysed by the crisis she was herself experiencing, and by the official atheism professed by the Soviet State. The Holy See sought to take advantage of this crisis to restore the 'seamless robe of Christ'. It gave repeated proofs of solicitude, placing the Uniats on a footing of complete equality with their brethren of the Latin rite. It cherished the hope, thanks to these Uniats,

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of one day seeing Slavonic Christianity return to Catholic unity, and the immense flock of all the Russians come back to the Roman fold. As is well known, the critical point in dogma is the divergence between the two Churches regarding the procession of the Holy Ghost. It is the famous 'Filioque' quarrel. Now, in the Liturgy published by the Holy See in June, 1943, for the use of the Russians and Ruthenians, the *Credo* is given according to the version of the early centuries, without reference to the 'Filioque'—in other words, ignoring the chief dispute which separated the Orthodox from the 'Romans'.

In spite of these concessions, Orthodoxy has never given up. In Carpatho-Ruthenia the number of its followers doubled from 1921 to 1930. Moscow had nothing to do with this; at that time it was the Serbian Patriarchate which presided over the destinies of the Russo-Carpathian Orthodox Church.<sup>1</sup>

And, after the incorporation of the Eastern Marches of Poland and of Carpatho-Ruthenia in the Soviet Union, a counter-offensive for the return of the Uniats to Orthodoxy was organised, using the customary resources of Russian political power. On June 18, 1945, a Committee of Initiative was formed, with a view to winning over these Catholics to Pravoslav unity. A 'Council' of the Uniat Church of the Western Ukraine was held in Lwow on March 8, 1946; it proclaimed the dissolution of ties which, for 350 years, had bound that Church to the Vatican,<sup>2</sup> and its submission to the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church. In the name of the delegates of the three Uniat Eparchies which were represented at the Council, a message was sent to Stalin announcing this decision, and the breaking of the spiritual bond between the Eastern Catholics and Rome.

The Bulletin of the Moscow Patriarchate<sup>3</sup> commented on this event as follows: 'So, gradually, day by day, in union and in united prayer, will the breach opened by Rome within the ranks of the Orthodox clergy be closed; the time is not far distant

<sup>1</sup> In 1921 the figures for Ruthenia were: Catholics 35,000; Uniats 332,500, and Orthodox 60,997. [162]

<sup>2</sup> The anniversary of the connection was commemorated by the encyclical letter *Orientalis omnes ecclesias*, published on January 19, 1946, in which the Pope accused the Russians of treating the Catholic Ruthenians as enemies of the State and encouraged the latter to persevere in their traditional faith.

<sup>3</sup> February 6, 1947.

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• 795 when the word 'Uniat' will survive only as a historical idea'.  
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 648 The Vatican published a note contesting the validity of this  
 [798] Council, recalling that part of the Catholic clergy of the Ukraine  
 had been cast into prison; it saw, in the Lwow decision, the  
 result of political pressure exercised by apostate priests.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, the movement spread. The Patriarch Alexis,  
 addressing the Uniates of Ukraine—formerly Poles or Czechs—  
 put its development in the domain of political realities: 'You  
 have always been united to Russia and her people by ties of  
 language and of customs. Now that Divine Providence has  
 restored to Russia her ancient frontiers, you are with us for  
 ever'.

In any case the role of Uniatism as the vanguard of  
 Catholicism in the Slavonic world seems to be, if not completed,  
 at least paralysed for many a year, despite the resistance of part  
 of the clergy and the support the dissentients can expect from the  
 Catholic Ukrainians of Canada and the United States. The  
 Bulletin of the Moscow Patriarchate<sup>5</sup> defined the lines on which  
 the 'unification' is being carried on, by opposing the  
 'œcumenical spirit' to the 'imperialist spirit'. 'Universality is  
 of God; Imperialism is of Cæsar. A new Orthodox era has been  
 inaugurated by the rebirth of Western Orthodoxy at the great  
 Council of Moscow; by the renewal of communion between  
 the Russian Orthodox Church and her Eastern sisters; by the  
 end of schisms and discords among the Orthodox (especially the  
 reconciliation of the Bulgarian Church with Moscow, and the  
 restoration of her rights to the autocephalous Georgian Church,  
 brought into subjection to the Moscow Synod by the will of  
 the autocratic Tsarist régime); by the journey of the Patriarch  
 Alexis who, for the first time, went to pray at the Holy Sepulchre  
 in 1945; and by the visit which the Metropolitan Nicolaï made  
 to the Orthodox Christians of Western Europe'.

Indeed, Orthodoxy is driving its offensive towards the West,

<sup>4</sup> Radio-Moscow protested, in its turn, against this assertion, affirming that  
 the Council represented 78% of the whole of the Uniat clergy. As for the  
 bishops incarcerated before the meeting of the Council, these were, they  
 said, traitors or accomplices of the German occupation. Cf., for the  
 Catholic point of view on Moscow's policy regarding the Uniate, Charles  
 Pichon: *Le Vatican*, in the series *Le Monde et l'Histoire* (Editions  
 S.E.F.I.), pp. 396 *et seq.* According to Pichon only 5% of the Uniat  
 priests had obeyed the Soviet injunctions.

<sup>5</sup> Of February 2, 1947.

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beyond the territories placed within its traditional sphere of influence, and especially in Czechoslovakia.

It is true that the saints given to the Church by the Czech nation in the tenth century appear both in the Orthodox and in the Roman calendars, but Orthodoxy disappeared as an official religion in the twelfth century. However, its influence did not completely disappear; it still had a latent existence in the time of John Huss and his disciples, who established relations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1451—which relations were interrupted by the capture of the city by the Turks two years later.

With Joseph II's Edict of Tolerance in 1781, Orthodoxy, previously eliminated by the religious reaction known as the Counter-Reformation, re-established itself in Bohemia. We have related above (p. 24) the enthusiasm with which the people of Prague heard a Serbian prelate conduct an Orthodox service and pray for the soul of John Huss on the Wenceslas Square, on the occasion of the 1848 Slav Congress. In 1874 the use of the Catholic Church of Saint Nicholas was granted to the Orthodox cult, which thereafter worshipped in it concurrently with the National Church. After the Vatican Council, and in spite of the hostility of the Austrian authorities, conversions which created a great stir took place. But it was only after the First World War that the Orthodox Church was organised in Bohemia. Not being able, at that time, to attach itself to Moscow, it placed itself under obedience to the Serbian Patriarchate of Karlovtsi, which, in September, 1921, consecrated the first bishop. This Czech Orthodox Church was itself torn by the current of dissidence created by the 'Czechoslovak National Church', which claimed to be based on the ideas of John Huss, but was in reality far from being so. In 1929 the Patriarchate of Belgrade approved the constitution of an Orthodox Eparchy (Bohemia-Moravia-Silesia) in which divine worship was offered in liturgical Slavon and in Czech.

When the two Resistance heroes who were parachuted to deliver Bohemia from her torturer, the 'Protector', Reinhard Heydrich, had executed the latter,\* they hid in the crypt of the

\* The execution took place on May 27, 1942, on the outskirts of Prague, in a street which bore the symbolical name of Strossmayer. The practical details of the murder curiously resembled those connected with the

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Church of St. Charles Borromeo, assigned to the Orthodox cult. They were discovered, and, after a regular siege, killed themselves rather than fall into the enemy's hands. The Orthodox Bishop Gorazd and his assistants, who had hidden them, were executed. And their church, which had just given martyrs to the national cause, was dissolved, and the cathedral turned into a shop.

After the liberation this church was restored to its rights and transferred (in April, 1946) from the jurisdiction of the Serbian Patriarchate to that of the Moscow Patriarchate, which raised Prague to the rank of an Archbishopric. On the following May 19 there arrived in the capital Mgr. Jelevferij, Exarch of the Patriarch of Moscow and Archbishop of Prague, who was received by the members of the Government and the Russian Orthodox Archbishop, Mgr. Sergej. The first service celebrated by the prelate was offered in memory of Bishop Gorazd.

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In the following June Karpov, President of the Soviet's Council of State for Orthodox Affairs, gave a talk on 'Religion in Russia' to officers of the Czechoslovak Army, to emphasise the liberty of divine worship permitted under the Soviet régime, and the clergy's loyalty to the State.

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As in the time of the Tsars, Catholicism has again become the 'sore point' of the Slavonic community. Soviet Russia, which had so ostentatiously dissociated itself from the religious tradition of the Slavophiles, has rediscovered the latter on its line of expansion. The Kremlin has, by the force of circumstances, been obliged to play the Orthodox card in the regions placed within its sphere of influence. But action is followed by reaction. If Uniatism is retreating before Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism represents, in Poland, in Slovakia, in Croatia, in Slovenia, a basis of resistance to Russian penetration in its twofold aspect of Marxism and schism. With the result that one would need the gift of prophecy to be able to say, today,

assassination of Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. Bishop Gorazd, Cikli, a parish priest, and Petzek, a curate, who sheltered the two heroes, were discovered on June 18.

The reconstituted Hussite Church aspired to the role of an official Church; it held a Congress at the beginning of January 1946, and its Primate, M. Kovar, presented the new bishops to M. Benes on the 23rd of that month. The President advised him to co-operate with the other Churches of the West and the East, taking care, however, not to mix politics and religion. The Church numbers 850,000 members.

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plete disaster. He was imprisoned, and Moscow declined the union.

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Ever since that time Moscow considered herself as the new and unique center of pure orthodoxy, of pure Christianity. When in 1453 Byzantium was invaded, Moscow's prestige became even greater in her own mind. The Muscovite monks, working out a sort of Muscovite historiosophy and formulating the Muscovite political program, gave a very significant interpretation of that catastrophe: Byzantium had been punished by God for the sin of the Union of Florence. And then came the establishment of the theory of the "Third Rome": "Two Romes have fallen, but the third still remains." This third Rome was Moscow.

Thus was established a Muscovite eastern Messianism. This Messianism became more and more universalistic in its scope. The Muscovite tsars began to consider themselves the representatives not only of their own Orthodox world but of the whole Orthodox community in the world and, even more, of pure, unsoiled Christianity in general. Very soon after the fall of Byzantium and the spread of the Turkish invasion in the Balkans, many Serbian and Bulgarian émigrés, intellectuals of those times, arrived in Moscow with all sorts of Bulgarian and Serbian Messianic and imperialistic conceptions and theories, modeled on Byzantium and on Greek and Hebrew texts. Messianistic honey was collected from these Bulgarian-Serbian-Hebraic-Byzantine hives by various monks and old men like Philotheus. There were fantastic genealogies, orthographical mistakes — consciously or unconsciously committed — daring eschatological solutions of such problems as why the world did not come to an end on March 25, 1492, which escape it was supposed to owe to Moscow for not having acceded to the Florentine union. Greek prophetic legends, exploited by Bulgars as well as by Serbs, legends promising victory for the *rusy* (reddish) race, *xanthos genos*, became *ruscky* (Russian) race; and so, as Professor Milyukov stressed, "an orthographical mistake became a source of the Russian imperialistic dreams about Constantinople and the Straits." In a word, ortho-

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186\* graphical errors and boundless imagination, fed on Byzantine and  
 175 autocratic Imperial doctrines, decided for a long time the style  
 668 of Russian political thought. Hence, practically, the Moscow  
 ● 795 Tsar and later the St. Petersburg Emperor became the head of the  
 church of a Byzantine Caesaro-Papist type and assumed the posi-  
 tion of a Byzantine theocrat. The conception of absolute power  
 coming from God, absolute in the universalistic sense, meaning  
 that the monarch was the ruler of all material goods as well as  
 of human souls, became established in Russia particularly in the  
 fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, after the period of the Mon-  
 golian yoke had excellently prepared the ground for such a con-  
 ception of monarchical power. As the ultimate result of these  
 events Moscow represented the type of an Oriental despotism  
 with a tendency toward state control characteristic of these or-  
 ganizations (especially at the time of the *oprichnina* of Ivan the  
 Terrible and later) and the equally characteristic tendency to-  
 wards imperialism based on Byzantine religious and historical  
 premises.

175 These bonds with Byzantium became particularly strong after,  
 643 and in connection with, the marriage of Ivan III to Sophia Paleo-  
 logus, the Byzantine princess in exile whom Ivan III received  
 from Italy. This marriage is also an interesting story. Both Rome  
 and Venice were still meditating a war against the Turks in order  
 to liberate Byzantium. For the realization of this new, grandiose  
 enterprise the help of the already developed might of Moscow ap-  
 peared very desirable. Moscow had succeeded at that time through  
 all sorts of belligerent activities and political manoeuvres in es-  
 tablishing its predominance among Russian princes and was on  
 the eve of liberating Muscovy from the Tartar yoke. Led by  
 western political conceptions, Rome and Venice thought that the  
 good will of Ivan III could be bought by the offer of the title of  
 king, and on the other hand by a marriage with a Byzantine prin-  
 cess who after the death of the legitimate heir to the Byzantine  
 Empire would become vested with the right to the Byzantine  
 throne.

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Ivan III was not very much interested in the European title of *king*, which did not mean very much to him. Moscow was so far away from the habits, manners, and international hierarchy of Europe that European distinctions and collaboration with Europe could not awake real interest in the exotic Muscovite state. On the other hand, Sophia Paleologus was considered by the Pope as a zealous Catholic; Ivan III needed a pure Orthodox fiancée. This last thing, however, was settled, and in 1472 Sophia Paleologus, the princess of Byzantium, the presumably zealous Catholic girl, became the Tsarina of Moscow and the most zealous of Orthodox ladies. The offers of the title of *king* interested Ivan, however, from one special point of view, from the very one which caused great discomfort in Cracow. Ivan III was supposed to become king or even emperor of the whole Russian nation (*in tota Ruthenica natione*). As I have said, Ivan III was not interested in the title, as he was not even very anxious to buy from the direct heir of the Byzantine throne the rights to the throne, and Andrew Paleologus had to sell them elsewhere. But the formula in *tota Ruthenica natione* awakened some interest, curiosity, and appetite in Moscow.

Ivan III had two reasons for being interested in this suggestion. The first one was connected with the fact that some of the lands which belonged to the Polish King and Grand Duke of Lithuania (in one person, as the King of Poland was at the same time the Grand Duke of Lithuania from the time of the union between Poland and Lithuania) represented ancient *voitchinas*, appanages, of the Rurikoviches, that is, of the ancestors of Ivan III. Moscow viewed this circumstance as making possible the expansion of the Muscovite Tsardom, and it opened the door to Russian, Muscovite territorial pretensions and demands.

On the other hand the Ruthenians who populated these lands were descendants of people who had been Christianized from the eastern source; therefore, they were Orthodox. The Union of Florence included them, but not to Moscow's thinking. Therefore Moscow saw in them the object of a religious mission, and that

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175 was the beginning of the Muscovite tendency to establish a protection extending to a great part of the citizens of the Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian commonwealth, which meant an interference in the domestic affairs of the Polish state. This state of affairs led in Poland to the Union of Brześć (Brest) in the year 1596, the purpose of which was to assure the Ruthenian church of Poland an independence of Moscow, which had become especially menacing since 1589 when a patriarchate dependent on the tsar was established in Moscow. However the Act of Brest did not settle this problem, because of disagreements among the Ruthenians and mistakes of the Polish policy. (The marriage of Alexander of Poland and Lithuania with Helen, daughter of Ivan III—she was Orthodox—reinforced the Orthodox feelings among the Ruthenians).

175 Poland was powerful enough in the era of Ivan III to stop the inappropriate Roman schemes connected with the problem of unifying all the lands that could be called Ruthenian. And the court of Cracow received satisfactory excuses from Rome in the matter. But Moscow did not give up, and in spite of the fact that the daughter of Ivan III, Helen, was married to the Polish King and Lithuanian Grand Duke Alexander, of the Jagiellonian dynasty, Ivan III seized every occasion to insist on his views and his territorial ambitions. And we see that ever since then Moscow has constantly spoken of cities and towns situated inside of the Polish commonwealth, constantly augmenting the number of cities mentioned, adding to these formulations the sacramental phrase "and many other cities and towns." . . . It is justly said by Mi-lyukov that "on even the most cold-blooded reader of these dry ambassadorial reports, these heavy rhythmic strides of the Muscovite 'Stone Guest' may produce the impression of some crushing nightmare."<sup>4</sup>

But what were these lands—Kiev, Smolensk, Polock, Witebsk, "and many others," constantly demanded from the time of Ivan

<sup>4</sup> *Ocherki po istorii Russkoi Kultury*, Paris, 1930, v. 3, p. 48. Cf. for the story of the Union of Florence, of Ivan III and Rome, the brilliant work of P. Pierling, *La Russie et le Saint-Siège* (1896-1912).

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Catholic church. Goldmann elaborated a very systematic plan for a consistent and gradual weakening of the Catholic church and its prestige in Poland. I have no space to enter into the striking details of that program which Kucharzewski revealed in his book; enough to say that it was indeed a diabolic program of systematic spoliation of faith through, first of all, confusion of the minds of the faithful. His aim was not only the Catholic Church but also the Uniate Church. Poles, White Ruthenians, and Ukrainians were to become, as Russian subjects, members of the dominant church of the Russian state. In his cautiously elaborated strategy not a single weapon has been forgotten: the building of Orthodox churches, the substitution of Orthodox crosses in the countryside for the Catholic ones, the institution of the Greek calendar, the organization of a press of Orthodox propaganda for the people, the appointment of only Orthodox directors and inspectors in the schools, etc. The Catholic priesthood must be weakened by the favoring of sectarianism and material spoliation. "It is difficult," he says, "to secularize one monastery; but the annihilation of 194 monasteries and the refusal of any noviciates in order to create from the unused wealth larger funds for the clergy will find many advocates among the clergy themselves. In general, the state should not hinder but help the clergy to surely and freely ruin and prostitute itself."<sup>17</sup>

This was, in broad lines, the program for eradication of all Polish ties with the West. One is justified in asking if this system which was adopted by the Russian government in Poland was not very close to the main ideas of the Slavophiles and Pan-slavists as far as the problem of Russian-Polish relations is concerned. As was mentioned before, at the time when Cherkassky and Samarin were active in Poland Slavophilism degenerated into Pan-russianism. Parallel to this there developed, especially during the time of the Slavic Congress in Moscow in 1867, Pan-slavic conceptions of the Slavs united under Russian leadership. The most complete and consistently developed program for the sub-

<sup>17</sup> Kucharzewski, *op cit.*, vol. II, pp. 281-297.

1 [Charles Edward Goldmann --- Analyst]

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especially poetry, even if it be the popular poetry. A synthesis appears absolutely impossible. It would be enough to compare the Czech versification and all the changes it went through with the Russian and Polish to see how great are the differences. Let us take the Russian *byliny* with their assonances, which have no correspondents in other Slavic productions. On the other hand the *Shchedrivky* and the *Koladki* are ritual poems often inspired by historical subjects of a purely Ukrainian character. A quite distinct group is represented by the Serbo-Croatian and Bulgaro-Macedonian popular poetry—heroic rhapsodies which sing of the legendary Serbian hero *Krilević Marko*, the mother of the *Jugović* and her sons and many others. This poetry which served the fantasies and mystifications of *Mérimée*, which enchanted Goethe, Pushkin, Mickiewicz and Nodier, represents a quite special formation and a unique genre in the Slavic world. How different is the medieval Polish poetry, only semi-popular in its most distant origins, with its origin in the Church. Its lyrical starting point is to be found in the *Kyrie Eleison* and *Alleluiah*, refrains of liturgical songs.

Let us abandon for a moment this purely philological statement and turn to a more essential factor which determined the historical development of the Slavic nations: I have in mind religion. Religion divided the whole Slavic world into two parts. Bulgarians, Serbians, Great Russians, Ukrainians, and White Ruthenians embraced Eastern Orthodoxy from a Byzantine source. Czechs, Croatians, Slovenes, Slovaks, and Poles embraced the Catholic religion from its Roman Source. And in addition the Czechs went through Hussism; a part of the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians adopted the Union. The Muscovite Slavophiles and Panславists were fighting against Catholicism. By that very fact they were in opposition to the whole Western Slavic world. Religion determined the cultural differentiation, and if we add to that some other historical factors we shall see that at the time when Russia was under the influence of Byzantium, of the Bulgarian and Serbian messianistic literature which formed her

- 795 theory of "Moscow the Third Rome," based on all kinds of im-  
 563 ported legends and apocryphas, Poland was shining in the sun of  
 177 the Renaissance. She had her Rabelais—Nicholas Rey, her Ron-  
 538 sard—Kochanowski, and a wonderfully rich and brilliant political literature connected with Latin republican writers, some of which was soon translated into foreign languages, even English.

The Southwestern Slavs, the Croatians, Slovenes, and Dalmatians also took part in the achievements of the Renaissance. They lived that period in contact with Italy while on the other hand Dalmatia was under the influence of several Byzantines. Let me recall the brilliant Italianism of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the flowering of the Dalmatian literature which followed the songs of the provençals troubadours, and of the *Dolce stil nuovo*. The Dalmatian muses found their inspiration in Petrarch, Boccaccio, Guarini, Tasso, Metastasio; this literature knew all genres from *canzone* to the pastoral drama and *la commedia dell' arte*. The Czechs went through this epoch carrying their religious reform—a heavy burden but rich in immense moral consequences. It is probably this reform that gave the definitive form to the moral and intellectual character of this Slavophil and Slavologist nation, least Slavic in its spiritual physiognomy.

The marvellous flowering of the Russian and Polish literatures in the nineteenth century represents again a kind of exception among the Slavic nations. And in spite of a close parallel development, these two literatures very often, following the same roads of literary evolution, in many ways contrast with each other.<sup>80</sup>

- 186\* So even if one should try to eliminate the purely political barriers separating the Slavic nations, such as the political antagonisms existing between Bulgars and Serbs, Serbs and Croatians, Russians and Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, Ukrainians and Great Russians, Ukrainians and Poles, etc., the problem of spiritual

<sup>80</sup> I have discussed these problems in a more detailed form in my article, "Existe-t-il un patrimoine commun d'études slaves?" Cf. *Le Monde Slave*, Paris, 1926.



538 nineteenth century, was only sporadically linked with earlier  
 197 attempts: it raised to literary usage a folk dialect of Herzegovina  
 and emphatically rejected Church Slavonic or Russian ingredients  
 and the influence of any older literary heritage. A similar populist  
 tendency characterized the rise at the same period of modern  
 literary Ukrainian which was first used in the burlesques of the  
 very late eighteenth century, and in its further development  
 oscillated between the Western (Polish-influenced) and the Eastern  
 (Russian-influenced) variants. Both Standard Byelo-Russian and  
 Macedonian modestly entered into literature in the nineteenth  
 century and acquired civil rights—the former after the First, the  
 latter after the Second World War. On the other hand, modern  
 Standard Bulgarian, likewise formed during the nineteenth century  
 after some isolated earlier attempts, strongly and consistently con-  
 tinued to borrow from Russian and particularly from its Church  
 Slavonic stock. Toward the middle of the same century, the  
 Slovaks, who had used literary Czech (somewhat adapted to their  
 own habits), inaugurated their own literary language based on the  
 Central Slovak dialect but patterned after standard Czech.

197 Church Slavonic perseveres as a liturgic language in several  
 796 slightly distinct variants: Nikon's recension is used by Greek  
 Orthodox Slavs (and—with somewhat stronger orientation toward  
 the old Kievan tradition—by the Greek Catholics); the pre-Nikon,  
 Great-Russian recension is followed by the Old Believers; the  
 Croatian Roman Catholics, in so far as they use Church Slavonic,  
 maintain their own recension, although since the seventeenth  
 century they have incorporated a considerable Kievan strain.

198 In the Slavic standard languages, besides Greek influence, pre-  
 177 vailing in the area of the Eastern Church, and Latin, predominant  
 in that of the Western, there can be noted a strong Turkic lexical  
 layer in Eastern Slavic and in the majority of Southern Slavic  
 languages, and a German stamp on the vocabulary and phraseology  
 of Slovenian and of Western Slavic languages and on the technical  
 terminology of modern Russian. To some degree all the main  
 Slavic literary languages in their recent phase bear French imprints.  
 Neighboring languages have undergone an appreciable Slavic  
 influence, principally in their vocabulary. This is particularly so

## INTRODUCTION

THE subject of this book is those organized bodies of Christians which formed the original nucleus of Christendom in Apostolic times, together with those Churches which owed their foundation directly to that nucleus and have not since broken their communion with it. That, at least, is a rough and ready description of the Eastern Orthodox Church. It consists of a number of independent and self-governing Churches which together constitute the second largest organized body of Christians in the world. Geographically they lie for the most part at the meeting of East and West, and this has been a dominating fact in shaping their destinies and in forming their distinctive character. East meets West in Russia in the north, and again in the South where Asia juts out westwards to touch Europe on the one hand and Africa on the other.

The Orthodox Church presents a spectacle of the most venerable antiquity and often of an impressive continuity of life which is second to none in Christendom. Its territory embraces the land where Christ himself was born and lived and died. It includes bishoprics in cities of which the names are already familiar words in the New Testament, Jerusalem itself, the Mother of all Churches, and Nazareth; Antioch where "the disciples were first called Christians", and many others. When St. Paul sailed out from Antioch, as many another after him in the history of that great Christian centre, he founded Churches some of which are flourishing centres of Orthodoxy to this day, though from others the glory has long since departed. He wrote letters to the Corinthian Church: the former Archbishop of Corinth, now Archbishop in America, was at one time Dean of the Greek Cathedral in Bayswater. One of the Seven Churches of the Book of Revelation was Thyatira: there is still a Metropolitan of Thyatira, though the

- 795 Christian population of the place was wiped out a century ago, and its late Archbishop, Germanos, lived for many years in London.

It is not as simple a matter as might be supposed to enumerate exactly all the independent Churches which are constituent members of the Orthodox Communion. The tumultuous events of the two world wars have left some of them in an uncertain position. It is a general principle of Orthodoxy that an independent nation has an independent Church; it is also an Orthodox principle that such ecclesiastical independence requires the recognition of the parent Church. Thus the various Churches of the Balkans became self-governing after the peoples concerned wrested their political independence from the Turks in the nineteenth century, and in due course their ecclesiastical independence was recognized by the Mother Church of Constantinople. The same parent Church has more recently (1927) granted autocephalous status to the Church of Albania. But political independence takes time to establish securely, it may even prove to be transitory. Moreover, parent Churches may display a very human reluctance to recognize the fact that their daughters have grown up.

There are organized Orthodox Churches in the Baltic States—in Esthonia, Latvia and Finland—as well as in Czechoslovakia, whose autonomy has been recognized by Constantinople. The Church of Georgia too, which was for long absorbed into the Russian Church, has, under the Soviet régime, regained its ancient independence. There is a difference in the degree of independence. An autocephalous Church is entirely independent and self-governing. It appoints its own chief bishop and conducts its relations with other Churches directly. Autonomous Churches are also self-governing and manage their own internal affairs. But the appointment of their chief bishops requires the sanction of the Mother Church, and it is through the Mother Church that their relations with other Churches are carried on.

Up to a point an order of precedence among the autocephalous Churches is recognized. Thus the four ancient patriarchates come first, in this order: Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem. Then comes the Church of

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the Island of Cyprus, after which there is no strict order of dignity. They are enumerated here roughly according to the number of their adherents, Russia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, Poland, Georgia, Albania, Sinai. To these must be added the autonomous Churches of Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Czechoslovakia.

It will be seen that the order of precedence by no means corresponds to relative size. The Russian Church is still, in spite of events since 1917, immensely the largest of them all, while the ancient Patriarchates have flocks numbering at most a hundred thousand or so each, and some much less. But Constantinople, the Ecumenical Patriarchate—shorn as it is of almost all its former splendour and dignity externally—retains its hold upon the reverence of the whole Orthodox Communion as the first of all its sees and the centre of its unity. The smallest of all these Churches is Sinai, which consists of no more than the Monastery on the mountain of that name and contains a score or so of monks.

In the Churches of Alexandria and Jerusalem, the Patriarch himself and the rest of the hierarchy are Greeks, but the enormous majority of their flocks are Arabic speaking, and the relations of these two elements have, in modern times, given rise to some dissensions.<sup>1</sup> The position was similar in the Patriarchate of Antioch, until in 1900 the Arab-speaking Orthodox succeeded in securing the appointment of a Patriarch of their own race and language.

In the Balkan peninsula the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Church of Greece are, of course, Greek, both racially and linguistically. The Serbs to the north of them are Slav, the Bulgars are a mixed race. Both use forms of Slavonic speech akin to Russian. In the midst of this great tract of Slavdom is embedded the Rumanian Church. The Rumanians claim to be a people of Latin origin and their tongue is derived from Latin. The fact that they are Orthodox by religion provides an interesting contrast to the Poles, who are Slav by race, but prevailing Roman Catholic in religion.

All these belong to what might be called the home lands

<sup>1</sup> See the Bertram and Young Report (Oxford University Press, 1926) for the Patriarchate of Jerusalem.

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795 of Orthodoxy, they are all places in which the Orthodox Church has been established for many centuries. But adherents of the Orthodox Communion are to be found in groups of varying size and importance in many other parts of the world. Russian imperial expansion under the successors of Peter the Great led them far afield to the north and the east, and again the Russian Revolution scattered them in all directions in the present century. Colonists from the Balkan countries have sought new homes in the New World, and many of them have settled in different parts of the British Empire. Thus the organized Church life of the Orthodox has extended far beyond its homelands and something of this modern expansion of Orthodoxy and its significance will be said in the last chapter of this book.

Everywhere it has borne with it its two names. To the Greeks it is the Orthodox Church, the Church which has received, which guards and teaches the right belief. To the Slavs it is "pravoslavny"—the Church which praises and worships aright. Each name expresses a cherished conviction which belongs to the very core of Orthodoxy. "The Orthodox Church" is its name in English. "The Greek Church" is too narrow, for many, indeed most Orthodox are not Greek. "The Eastern Church" is too wide, for Eastern Christendom includes beside the Orthodox, the Separated Churches of the East.

ooo The latter fall outside the scope of this book which is concerned with the Orthodox Communion only. But for the sake of clearness it may be well to add a few paragraphs here to show who they are and to distinguish them from the Orthodox East, particularly as the interest which attaches to them and their historical significance is out of all proportion to their numbers.

The first group consists of the people commonly called the "Assyrians". Now but a handful of refugees they are the remnants of the once mighty "Church of the East". The Church of Persia, as it then was, asserted its independence in the fifth century, and it has been separated from the Orthodox since the time of the Council of Ephesus, the decrees of which it refused to accept, and thus became, theoretically at any

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first permanent schisms within the Christian Church, played a 000 vital part in the historical development of the Orthodox Church.

The following pages are an attempt to show in bare outline a picture of Orthodoxy in its historical setting, its characteristic contribution to the life and thought of the Christian Church and its significance for the Orthodox people themselves. In a picture with so wide a scope, only salient features can be depicted. In the early centuries the fortunes of the Orthodox Church were involved in the prolonged and unsuccessful attempt of the Byzantine civil power to hold the disintegrating Empire together. In the long run, and in spite of divisions within itself, it refused to collaborate in holding the East by compromise with heresy, as later it declined to purchase material support from the West by recognition of the Papal claims.

With the loss of Syria and Egypt in the East, the increasing 795. estrangement from the West, and the incorporation of the Slav peoples into the Orthodox world, the axis of Orthodox consciousness veered round from an east-west direction to one which ran north and south, and Orthodoxy stood alone, conscious of itself as the sole guardian of the integrity of the traditional faith of Christendom, proud of its inheritance of Hellenistic culture and all too aware of the splendour of its civilization. The alienation from the Papacy was accentuated by the latter's recognition of a rival emperor in the West, and the sack of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204 both revealed how profound the break between East and West had become and set the seal of permanence upon it.

With the fall of the city in 1453 Greek and South-Slav Orthodoxy went underground, yet succeeded in preserving its life and maintaining its identity. In it the peoples, submerged beneath the rule of Islam, found not only consolation but hope also, and inspiration to cherish their national and cultural aspirations. They looked wistfully northwards to the only Orthodox country which was ruled by Christian sovereigns; to Moscow, itself still isolated from the West, but claiming to be the heir of the glory and Orthodoxy of Byzantium.

A mere glance at such a history helps the understanding of

## ORTHODOXY IN BONDAGE

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their expenses, through him, from the Greek bishops whom he appointed to the sees within his vast jurisdiction. They in their turn passed on the burden to their parochial clergy, who finally reimbursed themselves from their parishioners in the Balkans and Asia Minor. 793

It must be remembered that the level of education and culture really was higher among the Greek clergy of the Phanar<sup>1</sup> than among the Bulgars, Serbs and Rumanians, and to that extent there was good reason for appointing Greek bishops in those "daughter" Churches. But it is not surprising that the system, especially in its fiscal aspect, gave rise to much resentment, and that when in the nineteenth century the Balkan peoples began to recover their political independence from the Turks, they were equally eager to escape from their ecclesiastical dependence upon Constantinople. This movement met with its first success in 1833 when the Church of the Kingdom of Greece declared its independence, though it had to wait seventeen years for its recognition by Constantinople. The Serbian Church followed suit in 1879 and the Rumanian in 1885. These independent Churches were established not without struggle and a good deal of friction, but at least they have remained in full communion with Constantinople. In the case of Bulgaria, however, it led to schism. The Bulgars claimed more than ecclesiastical independence within a defined locality, i.e., the Kingdom of Bulgaria; they insisted that the head of the Bulgarian Church must have jurisdiction over all Bulgars wherever they may live. This the Phanar would not agree to, and branded it as the heresy of "Phyletism".<sup>2</sup> In 1872 the Ecumenical Patriarch, with the concurrence of the other Patriarchs, except Cyril of Jerusalem, excommunicated the Bulgars, and the Schism remained till 1945. 793 795 •

Nothing perhaps more clearly illustrates the isolation into which the East was driven by the Schism of 1054 and the Turkish conquest than the fact that it had no part in the making or opposing of the Reformation, that great cataclysm which shook and split, and yet revived, the Western Church in the

<sup>1</sup> The seat of the Patriarchate in Constantinople from 1586 onwards.

<sup>2</sup> Exaggerated emphasis upon the spirit of nationality in the ecclesiastical sphere.

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sixteenth century. That is not to say that the Reformation had no effect at all upon the East. Its repercussions were felt there in the following century, and about this something must now be said. It is connected with the person of Cyril Lucar, a remarkable and tragic figure, whose personality and writings dominated Orthodoxy in the seventeenth century. He was born in Crete, which was then still under Venetian rule, in 1572. It was to Venice, and also Padua, that he went as a student, after which he settled in Alexandria, where he was ordained, became an Archimandrite and took his place in the immediate entourage of the Patriarch. In due course the latter sent him on a mission to Poland, the purpose of which seems to have been to try to persuade the Protestants in that country to become Orthodox. It was a fateful journey for Lucar, for while there he became attracted to Lutheran and Calvinist doctrines and followed the trail of them to Wittenberg and Geneva.

On his return he succeeded his late patron who died in 1603, and became Patriarch of Alexandria. Seventeen years later he was made Patriarch of Constantinople and continued so intermittently till his death in 1638. His tenure of that high office is a conspicuous example of the insecurity that attached to it under the Turkish régime, for he was six times deposed and as often reinstated during those years. Both at Alexandria and at Constantinople Lucar made vigorous and persistent efforts to popularize the ideas which had aroused his enthusiasm in the West, and to establish a reforming movement within the Orthodox Church on the same lines as had been adopted by the Western Reformers. With the co-operation of the Chaplain to the Dutch Embassy at Constantinople he started a Protestant school in that city, and put out a Greek version of the Bible which he had printed at Geneva and which bore evident doctrinal marks of its place of origin. He conceived and carried out a plan for sending promising theological students to study in Switzerland, Holland and England, the best known of them being Metrophanes Kritopoulos (himself later Patriarch of Alexandria) who was sent to Balliol College, Oxford. Lucar's relations with this country are of great interest. He corresponded with Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury; and the



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fifth century manuscript of the Bible, known as Codex Alexandrinus which is one of the most precious treasures of the British Museum, was presented by Lucar to Charles I from the Library of Alexandria. **795**  
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This strange figure of a Protestant Patriarch encountered violent opposition. Not only had he to face the solid uncompromising body of traditional Orthodoxy, he was met also by the bitter hostility of the Jesuits and of a Latinizing party within his own Church which had been formed by the proselytizing efforts of Roman Catholic missions. These were very active at the time, and enjoyed the support of France and Venice.

In 1629, Lucar published his celebrated *Confession*, a document which contained much Calvinist doctrine and inaugurated a controversy which was not settled until the Synod of Jerusalem in 1672. Lucar himself was strangled by order of the Sultan on a trumped-up charge which his enemies brought against him. Just how far Cyril Lucar himself was a "heretic" has been disputed. It has been maintained that he did not hold the doctrines attributed to him, and the assertion of the Synod of Jerusalem that he did not write the *Confession* has been repeated by modern writers.<sup>1</sup> A synod held at Constantinople the year after his death condemned both Lucar and the *Confession*; the following Synods of Jassy and Jerusalem the *Confession* only. What is certain is that the Orthodox Church rose in a body to repudiate Lutheran, Calvinist or any other sort of "Protestant innovations"—whether Lucar held them or not.

The Synod of Jerusalem (sometimes called the Synod of Bethlehem, because it was convoked from that place) is of very great importance. It was convened with the express purpose of condemning the *Confession* attributed to Lucar but in doing so it promulgated a positive affirmation of the faith of the Orthodox Church.<sup>2</sup> Its acts include a Confession of Faith which "is a closely knit, carefully worked out summary of theological doctrine, in its phraseology very strongly **779**

<sup>1</sup> E.g., Mesolora, and others. See Gavin: *Greek Orthodox Thought*, footnote on pp. 214 ff.

<sup>2</sup> The Acts of the Synod of Justin, and Cyril's *Confession* may be found in English in J. N. W. B. Robertson: *The Synod of Jerusalem*, 1899.

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The Synod's Answer to the first three is that the Scriptures "should not be read by all but only by those who with fitting research have inquired into the deep things of the Spirit," and who understand how they should be read. The New Testament itself is quoted to shew that the Scriptures "are very profound and their sense lofty; and that they need learned and divine men to search out their true meaning." It is asserted that the Books of the Apocrypha are genuine parts of Scripture.<sup>1</sup>

In answer to Question 4, "Cyril" had said, "... We permit those that so desire to have icons of Christ and the Saints; but the worship and service of them ... we reject." The Synod, however, gives an answer of some length and reasserts the doctrine of Icons affirmed by the Seventh Ecumenical Council (see p. 54) and refers to that Council by name. It draws a clear distinction between worship as *latria* which may be offered to God alone, and the *dulia* with which the Saints and their icons are adored, or rather, honoured. There is further a higher degree of *dulia*, called *hyperdulia* which is paid to the Blessed Virgin Mary, "the Mother of God the Word. For though, indeed, the Theotókos be servant of the Only God, yet it is also His Mother as having borne in the flesh one of the Trinity; wherefore also she is hymned as being beyond compare, above as well all Angels as as Saints; wherefore also we pay her the adoration of *hyperdulia*."

Finally the *Confession of Dositheus* appeals by name to a number of writers who have written expositions of the Orthodox Faith, to the Fathers, to the Ecumenical Councils, as expressing the same teaching as the Confession. And even the heretics, it says, Nestorians, Armenians, Copts and the Ethiopians, apart "from their own particular heresies" believe the same thing.

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A few years before this Council of Jerusalem assembled, Macarius, the 147th Patriarch of Antioch, had returned from a journey to Moscow. It was his second visit to that city. He had been there before in 1655, when his son Paul, Archdeacon of Aleppo, had accompanied him, and kept a diary which is full of interest and at times diverting.<sup>2</sup> He made his journeys

<sup>1</sup>The Russian version omits this: and tones down somewhat the refusal of permission to all to read the Scriptures.

<sup>2</sup>Riddling: *The Travels of Macarius*. London, 1936.

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apparently in defiance of the Sultan's general order which forbade such travel without his leave, and one account says that the Sultan hanged him on his return; but the matter is obscure. The reasons for his visits to Russia, however, are clear enough. In the first place he went to collect alms for his flock, whom Turkish misrule had reduced to the last extremity of misery and debt. Russia was at this time the only Orthodox land under Christian rule, and it is rather pathetically referred to as "the land of the Christians" by one Oddib who celebrated in verse his master the Patriarch's return. Macarius's second journey was undertaken in company with Paisius, the Patriarch of Alexandria, to take part in the Council which tried and deposed Nikon of Moscow in 1666. 795.

To the Orthodox in bondage under Moslem rule, Russia appeared as a far off land of promise, a place of rest and peace, where Orthodoxy was free and honoured. And it is to Russia that we too must now turn.

## CHAPTER XII

### ORTHODOXY IN THE MODERN WORLD

797 THE modern expansion of Orthodoxy begins with the  
 • 795 romantic story of the Russian conquest of Siberia which was  
 begun by Yermak in the reign of Ivan the Terrible (1582). The  
 Russian, as Berdyaev often notes, is essentially a pilgrim and a  
 wanderer, and when he wanders abroad he takes his Church  
 with him. Thus, Orthodoxy has spread north-eastward, right  
 across Siberia and even into Japan, where one of the most  
 striking foreign missions in the history of Christendom led to  
 the establishment of a Japanese Orthodox Church. Its Metro-  
 politan claimed 40,000 adherents in 1931, and all its clergy were  
 Japanese. The Orthodox communities on the mainland of north-  
 east Asia have grown greatly both in size and in importance  
 since the Russian Revolution in 1917 drove many refugees and  
 settlers into that part of the world. The vast diocese of Harbin  
 includes adherents of various races, but they are mainly  
 Russians. Nor did the movement stop at the confines of Asia.

By way of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska, Orthodoxy  
 was introduced into the American Continent at the end of the  
 eighteenth century. The Russians were thus the first to bring  
 Orthodoxy to the New World, but since then members of other  
 Orthodox nations—Greeks, Albanians, Rumanians, Serbs and  
 others—have joined in the flood of immigration from the Old  
 World, and the Orthodox Church has travelled to America,  
 journeying from east to west as well as from west to east. A  
 Russian diocese was founded in South America in 1934.  
 Before the second world war there were eleven Russian dioceses  
 on the American Continent and four Greek. The Orthodox  
 bishops in the United States in a letter to President Roosevelt



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claimed to speak as representing six million people.<sup>1</sup> It is a significant fact that Athenagoras, the Greek Archbishop of America was in 1948 elected to the Ecumenical Throne of Constantinople. There is a Greek Orthodox diocese also in Australia, its archbishop resides in Sydney. Orthodox who live in South Africa too belong to a Greek diocese with its archbishop at Johannesburg. It is one of the seven dioceses of the Patriarchate of Alexandria, whereas the Australian diocese belongs to Constantinople. 797 795●

Nor must the Russian *diaspora* which followed the Revolution be forgotten. It led to the formation or the enlargement of colonies of Russian Orthodox in many cities of Central and Western Europe with the establishment of diocesan life outside Russia whose relation to the Mother Church in Moscow still remains unsettled.

Thus Orthodoxy is a world-wide phenomenon. Its significance cannot be fairly assessed only in terms of its homelands in the east of Europe. There, of course, the enormous majority of its adherents live, and there is the traditional centre of its prestige. But in considering on the one hand the impact of the modern world upon Orthodoxy and on the other hand any message that Orthodoxy may have for the post-war world, those scattered communities of Orthodox over the world cannot be left out of account. 795

The parallel with the Anglican Communion can hardly escape notice. That too, like the Orthodox, is made up of a number of independent self-governing Churches, each managing its own affairs, but all in communion with each other and finding their centre of unity in Canterbury as the Orthodox find theirs in Constantinople.

Thus Orthodoxy has come increasingly into contact with "the West", and members of other Christian Confessions have opportunities of becoming aware of it and of studying it by personal observation. Such opportunities are, indeed, much limited, but nevertheless Orthodoxy is no longer a remote phenomenon known to the West only through the medium of travellers' reports or the learned writings of experts.

<sup>1</sup> Bolshakoff : *Foreign Missions*, who gives many statistics about Russian Orthodox abroad.

795 Orthodoxy is in touch with the Ecumenical Movement, and its representatives have taken part in the conferences and assemblies which that movement convenes. Modern Russia, and especially modern Greece, have produced a number of able and erudite theological scholars fully competent to place Orthodoxy in the setting of the modern world. It is characteristic of Orthodoxy that many of its greatest theologians are laymen. For in the Orthodox Church, theological learning is not regarded as a clerical preserve. It is part of that task of guarding and preserving the Faith which is conceived as the function of the whole Church, of the *laos*, the people of God.

But Orthodoxy has been cautious, and to some extent suspicious in its contact with other Confessions. Its readiness to come into closer touch with them has ebbed and flowed. For instance, in 1925 almost the whole Orthodox world was represented at the Nicene Commemoration in London. But in 1948 the Orthodox assembled at Moscow to celebrate the five-hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the independence of the Russian Church, all, with the exception of the representatives of Constantinople and Greece, subscribed to pronouncements which, as well as expressing the traditional Orthodox hostility to the Vatican, were unfavourable both to the recognition of Anglican Orders and to the Ecumenical Movement. They declined to take any part in the meeting of the World Conference of Churches at Amsterdam in that year.

Whether this attitude was to any extent due to political causes and adopted under Russian pressure as consonant with the general cleavage at the time between Russia and the West, is a question which different people will answer with different guesses. But what is beyond question is Orthodox uneasiness at the possibility that the Ecumenical Movement might move towards an attempt to set up a sort of inter-confessional super-church, which seeks unity through a process of dilution, and accepts as its faith the lowest common denominator of the respective beliefs of those who compose it. In actual fact, Amsterdam itself made it clear that nothing of the kind was contemplated. But the uneasiness exists in the Orthodox mind; and it not only fears that unity may be sought in what

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they regard as the wrong way, but frankly suspects the motives which inspire the Ecumenical Movement.

In any case, it is well enough known that when the West enters into relation with Orthodoxy it must expect to meet with a conservative attitude. The Orthodox are of course conservative. But theirs is not a conservatism which is rigid and passive, with eyes only for the past and with ears which are deaf to the voices of the modern world. It is not a mummy swathed in the bands of tradition. Theirs is a conservatism which can shew itself surprisingly flexible at times, and it is an active sense of guardianship. Its stress is upon truth rather than upon authority.

For the Orthodox Church conceives itself as the whole Church, and to it is committed the deposit of faith, the truth of the divine revelation, which is one and the same in the first century or the tenth or the twentieth, which is susceptible of explanation, but not of change. The conservatism of Orthodoxy is due to the fear lest this trust should not be fulfilled, lest any generation of Orthodox should hand on to the next less than, or something other than it received. This inherent quality has been emphasized and strengthened by the history of the Orthodox peoples. For all of them have at one time or other, and some for long periods, been subject politically to an alien, hostile and non-Christian despotism when their religious life was their only corporate life, and their Christian faith the symbol of all their hope.

This conception of its life as custodianship, this stress upon truth rather than upon authority is perhaps what saves the relations of Orthodoxy with other Confessions from being a mere demand for submission. There is a wide difference between one bishop's saying "all Christians must submit to my jurisdiction", and the Orthodox "if you hold the same faith as we, you are indeed one with us". "The Faith" is primary, everything else is secondary, and it is of the first importance to grasp this Orthodox point of view. "The first mark of the Church is that all her teachers and pastors agree with each other in everything." This startling assertion was made by Metrophanes Kritopoulos in his *Confession*, which is one of the Symbolic Books of Orthodoxy.

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•795 The Faith of the Church is now what it always has been. Dogma is not a fossilized deposit from the minds of the past. It is a living experience of the whole body of the faithful. If you hold the Church's faith and live the Church's life, then you belong to the Church. That is where the stress lies in Orthodoxy. It follows that the great offence against the life of the Church is innovation on the part of any of its members—or group of its members. The idea that since A is true and B is true, and since by the process of logical deduction in human reasoning C follows, therefore C can be erected into a new dogma, is an idea they will not accept. This is the root of their doctrinal quarrel with the Vatican and the distinguishing tenets of Roman Catholicism.

The motive of the Orthodox in entering into discussions with other Christian bodies is perfectly clear. It is two-fold. First to explain their own position, and secondly to ascertain whether those with whom they are conferring do actually hold "the Faith". It is never with the idea of arriving at an amalgam or a mutual adjustment, a working compromise, or an agreed minimum or anything of that kind.

Meanwhile it will be found that they can treat those outside the visible boundaries of Orthodoxy with a surprising degree of accommodation. For in a sense there is no sharply defined edge to Orthodoxy. It is not primarily an institution but a life. It admits of degrees. It may exist to a greater or less extent, or in embryonic form, beyond the limits of the external Orthodox world. The Orthodox hold that the Church (i.e., they themselves) has the power to give an "economic" recognition, under certain conditions, to the sacramental acts of another body of Christians. It is on the strength of this that ministration by Anglican priests to the Orthodox laity and *vice versa* have occurred in different parts of the world. A striking catalogue of such cases could be compiled. On the same ground the Church of Constantinople and some others of the autocephalous Orthodox Churches have recognized Anglican Orders as possessing "the same validity as those of the Roman, Old Catholic, and Armenian Churches possess"; that is to say, not absolutely and in principle, but so far as the Orthodox can judge pending the assurance of identity of faith.



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The collapse of humanism and the breakdown of liberalism under the impact of the great wars which have characterized the twentieth century have left a frightening blank in men's minds, and in this state of affairs Orthodoxy has its word to say. 195

The Greek's own name for their Church is "Orthodox"—they claim to hold unaltered and unimpaired the true doctrine taught and handed on by the Apostles. No less significant is the name by which the Slav members of the same Communion designate it. They call it "Pravoslavny"—the "right-praising" or "right-worshipping" Church. To the Orthodox religion is primarily—though not, of course, solely—belief expressed in worship. Their worship is dogmatic, the truths of their Faith are repeated in it again and again, it re-echoes with glad assertion of what God has done and revealed of Himself in the Christian Gospel, in the experience of the Church, in the lives of the saints. 795 781

At the same time it is all couched in the language of poetry and the Service is always sung. The "aesthetic approach" to religion is often spoken of as characteristic of Orthodoxy. There is a legend which was held to explain how Russia came to adopt the religion of Constantinople. Envoys were sent in various directions to investigate different forms of Christianity. Those who had been sent to Constantinople came back and reported on the worship they had witnessed in Justinian's superb Church of the Holy Wisdom. Never had they seen anything like the beauty of it. "We felt we were in heaven rather than on earth," they said. Their description of all this beauty carried the day. "That is the religion for us," cried the Russians.

The truth of this story is in its symbolism. There is in Orthodoxy a real recognition that beauty is one of the links which bind the earth to its Creator. There is much beauty in Orthodox worship, in its buildings, its vestments, its appointments, its music and the quiet unhurried dignity of its movement. Time is of no account in its symbolic representation of the drama of the Life and Death of Christ, and of little account in the actual passing of the moments as anthem and repeated litany unroll themselves. All this is not to say that the outward expressions of Orthodox worship are always more beautiful than those to be found in the West. That would be to reduce the matter largely to a question of individual taste. And,

● 795 indeed, ugliness is to be found in Orthodox churches, as it is  
781 elsewhere, though perhaps not quite so often; ugliness as  
blatant as that polished alabaster and those brazen whatnots  
which make us wince in many a Victorian church.

But the phrase "aesthetic approach" must not be taken in too narrow a sense. The "aesthetic approach" of Orthodoxy is not only *through* beauty but also *in* beauty, and it involves the reception of beauty. It is the sense of the beauty of the unseen world, which is reflected in this world, which dominates it. The Orthodox feeling for religion is a vital awareness of the Resurrection of Christ as a source of salving, reinvigorating power which is to rescue and transform the whole Cosmos. Its goal is the rescue of all creation from corruption, the transfiguration of the Cosmos, the restoration of its original beauty, as well as of its pristine goodness. Thus the icon, for instance, is not only a human attempt to achieve beauty and offer it in the service of God. It is much more a scrap of the material world which has been rescued from corruption and made a vehicle by which the unseen world comes into touch with men and in which the divine beauty dwells.

Thus in the flux and confusion of the modern world where men are groping for new certainties amid the ruins of by-gone stabilities, Orthodoxy proclaims a definite body of beliefs anchored in historical facts, and expresses that belief in worship. It is, therefore, conscious of a mission to the world. It is aware of its Orthodox life as a cleansing, restoring and transfiguring agency in a world which "lies in evil".

It may with justice be said that for long periods that sense of mission has lain dormant. Or at least that owing largely to the political environment in which the Orthodox Church was set and to which its hierarchy has too often been submissive, the sense of mission has failed to find active expression. But it was never dead, and from time to time it awakes and demands new outlets and new methods of presenting Orthodoxy to the world as new circumstances arise and the conscience of the Church is quickened to meet them.

A notable example is the Zoe Movement in Greece which was founded in 1907 and came into public notice with the appearance of its periodical *Zoe* a few years later. The move-

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ment originated in a brotherhood, the members of which took no permanent vows and had no rigid rule. But they lived in common; the majority of them were laymen, and they were trained theologians. They were an unofficial independent body and as such had to meet some opposition at first. Their purpose was first to live the Orthodox life themselves, and then to bring it home to the masses of the people in Greece. The members of the Zoe Brotherhood were teachers, they fostered the revival of preaching and set up a press for the printing of cheap books of religious instruction and devotion. (Not so very long before this, according to the former Archbishop of Corinth, nine-tenths of the Greek parochial clergy were incapable of writing their own names.)<sup>1</sup> They laid great stress upon Confession, and they organized Sunday schools. Their efforts met with much success and the response of the people was visible and striking.

A rather different illustration of the recuperative strength of Orthodoxy is afforded by the action of the Russian Church in the period between the two revolutions of 1917. In August and September of that year, in spite of the condition of civil disorder, the Council of the Russian Church met in Moscow and set itself vigorously to the task of reform. The former Holy Synod abolished itself, and the Patriarchate was restored. The Church turned to the reorganization of its own government in view of the changes which had taken place in civic life. An extensive programme of work was undertaken by the Council in its 170 sittings, and the fact that much of it was rendered ineffective by subsequent developments in the relations of Church and State should not be allowed to disguise the inherent vigour and the faith in Orthodoxy which the Council revealed.<sup>1</sup>

The remarkable cohesive strength in the Orthodox Communion is a fact to be noted. Since the time of the breakaway of the Monophysites described in Chapter II, the Orthodox world has remained one united family of Churches, in spite of temporary estrangements and quarrels. They are held together by no monarchical system of government, but,

<sup>1</sup> See *The Christian East*, July, 1937, and December, 1937.

<sup>1</sup> See an account of this period by a Russian writer in the Sixth Report of *The Anglican and Eastern Churches Association*, 1921.

795 according to their own account, by community of faith and  
 781 love. In this respect their life is in striking contrast with the  
 fissiparous tendencies displayed by the West. The Orthodox  
 Church includes men of different races and languages, they  
 are frankly national in outlook, they worship in the language  
 of the people, not in a common and liturgical tongue. There  
 are marked divergencies of temperament, especially between  
 Greek and Slav which run like an undercurrent beneath the  
 surface of their history and threaten disruption, as much now  
 as ever. Yet in spite of all this the Orthodox Communion  
 holds together and retains its identity. The case of Bulgaria  
 serves but to underline the fact. For the schism which occurred  
 in 1871 between Constantinople and the Bulgarian Church,  
 precisely on the grounds of what the former regarded as the  
 excessive nationalism of the latter, has now at length been  
 healed, and Bulgaria is once more restored to the full com-  
 munion of Orthodoxy. This unity in diversity which maintains  
 itself in the face of so many factors which might make for  
 disintegration, and which owes its existence to no coercive  
 principle but to bonds which are intangible and belong to the  
 moral and spiritual sphere, is an impressive fact of which a  
 disordered world may well take note.

795 If the life of the Orthodox Church in past centuries has  
 659 been conspicuously defensive, a rôle of guardianship of its  
 faith and a willingness to suffer in its defence, the twentieth  
 century has revealed the fact that such a life has not ceased to  
 be the vocation of Orthodoxy. The geographical situation of  
 the Orthodox peoples in Eastern Europe places them in a  
 peculiarly exposed position in the conflict which atheistic  
 Communism wages with all forms of religion. This conflict  
 is something new in the modern world. The Christian creed  
 and way of life have been rejected before by individual people  
 or small groups. Alternative creeds have been proposed and  
 accepted, more or less in the seclusion of the study. But the  
 twentieth century has seen the proclamation of rival creeds to  
 the Christian in the market place, publicly, with explicit  
 claims to be superior, supported by argument and backed  
 perhaps by force. Communism, with its definite philosophy of  
 history and its altruistic appeal on behalf of the downtrodden



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and oppressed, has made vast numbers of converts at the expense of Christianity.

This is not the place to discuss the compatibility of Communism with Christianity in theory. It has claims to be regarded as in itself a religion, inasmuch as it has its own philosophy of life which is totalitarian in character, and an equipment of fundamental ideas which claims the allegiance of the whole personality and seeks to control every aspect of life. It insists upon rigid and impeccable orthodoxy in its party members; it has its heresy hunts in the form of purges, its sacred texts and its official interpretation of them. Like Christianity itself, it has its Golden Age in the future, not in the past, but for the Communist the Golden Age will be reached within the confines of this world and within historical time.

Communism has secured political power in the countries of Eastern Europe and here it finds itself face to face with Orthodoxy. If in Yugoslavia the interesting fact has come to light that politically Communism can assume a form which deviates in some respects from the Soviet pattern, yet its attitude to religion remains that of Communism elsewhere when in power. The crux of the conflict lies in the fact that Christianity also claims the whole man, body, soul and spirit, and neither can in theory tolerate the existence of another *total* allegiance. The clash is emphasized by the fact that Communism regards this other allegiance as an aberration of the human mind, and the idea of the spiritual principle in man as an illusion.

So far as words are concerned freedom of religion is guaranteed under Communist rule, but the Communist has his own meaning for the word freedom, as he has for many other words, and in practice Orthodoxy, in common with other forms of religion, faces attack.

It is subject on the one hand to a stream of propaganda of which perhaps the most potent aspect is the explicit assumption that religion is due simply to lack of education. On the other hand it suffers from insidious attempts to undermine the position of religious leaders and to discredit them in public opinion. This may culminate in a trial, the pattern of which has become familiar and may include the uncanny and macabre "confession" of the accused.

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Meanwhile, pending the disappearance of religion under the influence of enlightened education, Communism is prepared to use it as a tool. Like art, literature, history and science, religion also is to be pressed or cajoled whenever possible into the service of the Communist *Weltanschauung*. The case of Bulgaria may suffice as an instance: In June, 1948, a letter was sent from the Department for Religious Affairs in the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry to the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the head of which, the Exarch Stepan, with the Synod behind him, had attracted the attention of the Government by his wise but firm attitude in defence of the rights of the Church and the claims of religion. The letter contained the following sentences:

"The representatives of the Church must not criticize the people's rising of 9th September, 1944, and the subsequent change of government."

"The nationalization of private industry and the mines must have the approval and daily support of the hierarchy of the Church."

"The representatives of the Church must stress, in their daily work, their respect for the State and their acknowledgment that the State stands above the Church, and that the Church fulfils the laws of the People's Republic and the State's discipline."

"It is further required that the Church should make certain changes in the educational system of her institutes where—the government claims—subjects are taught which contradict the scientific knowledge of the evolution of nature and society and which are opposed to the democratic and progressive spirit."

"It is desirable that the Church use the pulpit, the Church press and private talks for the education of the faithful in love for the state leaders of Bulgaria and Soviet Russia and to ask that their portraits be placed in public places and private homes."

There was, moreover, a significant note that the reply to this letter should be signed individually by each member of the Synod.

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The solid front of the Synod disintegrated under pressure brought to bear upon its individual members, and Stepan found himself obliged to resign.

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The general picture must not be drawn too much in sheer black and white. There is a Communism which is not the sworn foe of religion; and even when it is, it is well to recall Berdyaev's frequent warning that even the fight against God may be a form of affirming God if it is a protest against unworthy conceptions of God which have allowed cruelty and injustice to prevail in human life.<sup>1</sup>

But so far as the Orthodox Church in the Communist State is concerned, we may remember that Orthodoxy has tried conclusions with the secular power before. In the interests of political unity the Byzantine Emperors often tried to force it to come to terms with heresy, as later they endeavoured to impose upon it union with Rome upon Rome's conditions in order to save the State. There was everything to be said for the Emperor's attitude from the worldly point of view and much perhaps from the spiritual point of view also. But Orthodoxy refused to compromise. Henri Grégoire assures us that it is no paradox to represent the religious history of Byzantium as a conflict between the Church and the State, from which the Church emerged unquestionably the victor.<sup>2</sup>

Orthodoxy lived for centuries under the harsh Government of the Turk. But with the coming of political emancipation, it is found to have retained its faith intact, its identity unimpaired and its unity preserved. It has known how to bend before the storm and, unbroken, to abide its time. Doubtless it has had its sinners, its time-servers even in high places. But the two-fold cry of Orthodoxy "Lord have mercy" and "Glory be to Thee O Lord", has rung out above them all, and still rings out. The host of its saints and prelates and of common folk held fast to their faith in the power of the Resurrection to transform the whole world, and they have seen and see in Orthodoxy the authentic faith of Christ, for which many of them have been prepared to die.

<sup>1</sup> See the Report of the Lambeth Conference, 1948, Part II, p. 20 ff., London, 1948.

<sup>2</sup> Baynes and Moss: *Byzantium*, p. 130.

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771 describe a number of local or tribal cults; nor is it justifiable  
175 to imagine a basis of a uniform primitive Slav system.

In the South, that is to say, in the Lower Danube basin and in Illyria, tradition ascribes the first conversions to Christianity to the time of Heraclius, and there seems not to have been the same fierce and prolonged opposition to the new cult, with which it had to contend in Russia and Northern Europe. In Russia and in Poland, a dual confession, and apparently a heathen priesthood, lasted into the later Middle Ages; in the eleventh to twelfth centuries attempts were made to re-establish the old faith on a national basis. True, the rising in Bulgaria against Boris (eleventh century) was led by an anti-Christian element, but we do not know of an active  
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● 795 priesthood in this connection, nor whether it was a revival  
779 of Slavonic or Asperuh tendencies. Until the final establishment of a national, autonomous Church in Bulgaria, and in fact, until the turning-point of the Synod of Trnovo (seventeenth century), the indecision as to belief was evident not only in the varying allegiance to pope or patriarch, but in the activities of the numberless heretical sects, not merely tolerated, but at times enjoying considerable privileges and influence.

SP The presence of these sects, notably of a gnostic character,  
795 pre-dates the Orthodox missions of the tenth century, and  
797 caused their retreat from Pannonia. The earliest account of the Slav apostles mentions the 'thrice heathen heretics' who were unacquainted with Slavonic; probably referring to that mixture of Paulician and Eulite doctrine, which, since the fourth century, had spread into the Northern Balkans, and remains to this day among the Nazarenes of the trans-Danube. Syrian and Armenian colonies had been established in Thrace during the seventh century in the time of Constantine, still known to M. Psellos and Cedrenos as Massalians. Armenian Monophysites and Paulicians lived in the neighbourhood of Plovdiv, Sofia, Devol, Rila, Moglena, Kjustendil, etc., from the eleventh to the thirteenth century; the Dragovisci being known in South-east Macedonia as extreme



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dualists since the tenth century, and the Macedonian Kudi-geri flourishing until the fifteenth century. Many of these local sects have left traces of their former habitation in place names. These facts alone would necessitate a critical attitude towards the unilateral character of the 'Iranian theory' of old Slavonic religion, since features claimed to show community of custom may equally well derive from these later historical contacts.

Under various names, the Bogomil or Bulgarian Heresy, described as a mixture of Paulician and Massalian teaching, spread from some such centre as far as Ohrid (according to the accounts of Dimitrij Homatijan, Archbishop of Ohrid, 1217-34); and to Albania (probably during the second Bulgarian occupation); took firm root in Bosnia; for a time troubled the Catholic areas of Dalmatia; appeared in favour in Croatia, in the time of Honorius III being embraced by local nobles and princes; and in Bulgaria Bogomilism was near becoming the official state religion in the thirteenth century. In Rascia, it provided one of the principal activities of the first members of the Nemanja dynasty, whose biographers reckoned them amongst the most zealous defenders of Orthodoxy; nor had the heresy been entirely disposed of in their realms in the time of Stefan Dusan. Later, it found fanatical adherents in Russia, where its teachings were in evidence until recent times.

There is no doubt that the Catharians of Lombardy, and kindred sects in Western and Central Europe, derived their versions of the scriptures directly from a Balkan source; but the Bulgarian heresy, as it appears in the Northern Balkans, has a peculiar character, which can only be explained by a local modification of the Armenian prototype. Did it here absorb the non-Christian element, or develop spontaneously along the lines of popular ideas?

It is not entirely due to imperfect information or a desire to discredit heresy at all costs, that the heretics are mentioned in connection with what had come to be regarded as popular superstitions, magic, and practices which pre-date Chris-

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Certain minor observances of conduct, which we have noticed throughout the so-called patriarchal zone, but which vary considerably from place to place, such as not crossing the feet, using right or left hand for certain operations, wearing certain colours, etc.—in short, at all times a care that everything be done in a way fitting to the conditions, according to some precise ruling of custom—exist because otherwise an evil force can be inadvertently put in motion, or a man work on himself or his associates some kind of auto-curse.<sup>1</sup> Particular care must be taken as regards children and domestic animals, who naturally cannot be expected to understand the importance of such observances, and must therefore be prevented from doing the wrong thing. Hence in part the arbitrary influencing of omens.

'I fear to go to the four parts of the earth, and over the whole earth,' says the devil in a Greek manuscript (sixteenth century) when he descends to fetch earth for the creation of man. 'Therefore, he made a sign of the cross with his sceptre, saying: "East, west, north and south." Thereupon all the earth came before God.'

The so-called Bogomil creation legend, slightly varied, occurs in Russia, Transylvania, in Dobrudja, in the Rhodopes, in Western and Southern Bulgaria, and right across the middle of the Peninsula, in Macedonia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Eastern Serbia and in Old Serbia, and probably elsewhere. It is found in manuscripts from the twelfth century, in Old Bulgarian, Russian, Serbian and Bosnian books. On the one hand, there are versions similar to that of the Book of Enoch, the Vision of Isaiah, and the 'Secret Book' of the Bogomils. On the other, it links up a chain of cosmogonic myth shared by the Finno-Ugrian and Ural-Altaic peoples, and in the traditional version known to Slavonic folk-lore it is more like this latter.<sup>2</sup> It is of interest to note that an

<sup>1</sup> v. *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> Similarities between Slavonic, Finnish and Central Asian cults and mythology first came to the notice of students of Russian custom, notably P. Jacobi and Prof. Anickov. The latter's views are theories rather than

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early Russian chronicle attributes a very similar cosmogony to Volhs (*magi*) at Kiev, long before the first traces of Bogomil apocryphal literature in Russia.

The fact of the matter is, that most of the apocryphal literature, important for creating a new source of popular legend in the Balkans—e.g. the Apocalypse of Baruch, Gospel of St Thomas, the Palaia, Vision of Isaiah, etc.—appeared in Slav versions, often markedly differing from any known Greek originals, as early as the eleventh century, and possibly before Bogomilism as such had established a popular hold or, at any rate, a literature of its own. To Jeremije, the Bogomil, is generally attributed the Slavonic version of the Elucidarium. Here, again, no exact Greek prototype can be discovered. Neither the devil's contract motif, nor that of his appearance over the primeval waters in the form of a diving bird, and other significant details, can be traced with any certainty beyond the Slavonic versions.

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Only on going westwards into Bosnia, it seems certain that the literary form preceded the popularised story. Otherwise, it is clear that the Slav writers of the Middle Ages made considerable use of popular sources, unaware of any inconsistency of doctrine, and tempering their material to taste. In the beginning, according to a Russian monastic writer of the seventeenth century, Almighty God resided in the three chambers of the upper heaven. 'The three chambers of the cross,' he says, in iconographical symbolism. 'The Emperor without beginning, uncreated, unspeakable, not born, not conceived, universal, invisible and unseeable, immortal and immaterial' was there before time. By his thought he gave birth to his Son. 'For the Father is neither created nor begotten, and the Son is begotten and not created. The Holy

substantial history; but there is documentation in his *Jazykstvo i druzhba Rusi* (1914), and in more recent articles in *Slavia* and *Revue des Etudes Slaves* (viii). More relevant theories are put forward by M. Arnaudov in Sb.N.U. iv. Older works include Spicyn, *Samanizn i otzeleni k ruskoj arheologii*, Zapiski Arheolog. xii; V. Bogoraz, *K poiskam kumanstva* (Etnograf. Obozrenie, xxii, i), where traditions of the type given above will be found.

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## IV

SOURCES OF ANCIENT MAGIC  
AND MEDICINE

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During the pagan and semi-pagan period the Slavs lived in small, independent tribes, later forming loose federations within territorial limits. For long the Greeks were unable to negotiate with them, because they did not agree among themselves and had no central authority. The organisation of a united state in Rascia coincided with the establishment of state Christianity, and the pagan empire of Bulgaria was comparatively short-lived.

The tribal religious cult was likely to have been an extension of a domestic cult, probably rarely accompanied by the specialised functions of an official priesthood. The domestic cult lasts to the present day. The head of the household officiates in ceremonial, and the assistance of an outsider is not essential. In ceremonial which involves the whole tribe or village, the heads of households—the tribal elders—are again responsible; but that they have not an entire monopoly of ritual is evident in ceremonies which are performed by a group without a specially chosen leader, particularly those which belong to the younger people, or ceremonies conducted by old women doctors, etc.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The rites of the peasants hint also at an independent development. It is not true only that the non-Christian element enjoyed a revival, tended to revert to type, after the fall of the mediaeval empire. A direction was taken at that time, perhaps, in which the popular religion continued a course of development and adaptation. The popular religion, or sometimes a popular aversion to religion as well as to social forms that flourished under a feudal church, must have sought new outlets much earlier. Local forms of peasant cults must be of comparatively recent growth, and contain more than the survivals of an ancient paganism. The *slava*, for instance, is a typical example of a domestic rite which does not require a special priesthood. It has become perhaps the central



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There is little trace of shamanism in the Balkans, and few instances of the combining of the functions of priest and doctor and magician except by accident. In peasant cults these offices are adopted to meet a special occasion, unless they are the speciality of a local wise woman. Women who have ceased to menstruate or widows may have to be chosen for certain rites, but this is only a temporary priesthood. The seeress mediates between ordinary people and spirits only when she is required to do so. Young men without physical defect only may be allowed to take part in certain ritual dances, etc. Almost each cult has its own 'priest'. The fulfilment of the village 'vows' and the sacrifice at the sacred village tree is performed by householders, and the high priest of the occasion is the host for that year. The mother of twins is, it is said, considered to be specially pure, and twins themselves have special occasional functions. I hazard that this arrangement is characteristic of peasant cults; and that the institution of a monopoly of priestcraft, whether on the part of the Christian church or by the priests of organised pagan cults, meant a profound social change, to uphold which popular custom had to be discredited.

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In Russia itself, so many parallels are found that a close

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feature of the religious life of South Slav Orthodox communities and has died hard among the non-Orthodox. It represents an elaboration under peculiar circumstances of a strictly domestic cult with occasional ministrants, whose sporadic priestly duties are determined by their normal social function and status. A similar Lithuanian rite was also traditionally a strictly domestic affair. The *slava* embraces ideas and ceremonial found in the earliest accounts of Slav custom and which belonged to pre-Christian ideas, but other features, and the general form as we now know it, so closely resemble the celebration of the liturgy that the institution may well have arisen from an early practice of private celebrations, or imitations of the liturgy, perhaps at a time of a Christian minority, or further encouraged by the conditions of Turkish occupation. There is still a tendency to think that anything that is not traceable to the Churches' institutions is necessarily pre-Christian in origin. The cycle of Christmas rites also shows a mixture of sources and evidence of late formation, and considerable local variety when the cycle of the whole season, which may include rites transferred from other seasons, is considered. In any case, the past is not always 'fossilised'. While a

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connection with Asiatic shamanism was suggested many years ago. On the whole, the characteristics of magical practice are better mapped regionally than ethnologically; the Russian and West Slavs falling beside the Baltic and Finnish races of the north; while Balkan Slav folk-lore more closely resembles that of the neighbouring southern races.

In the process of time a religious sentiment has grown up about the ritual inherited from ancient semi-magical rites; and direct magic, conceived as such, figures principally as a part of a medical system, in which, however, empiricism now predominates, and magic is applied rationalistically. This division between applied magic and religion, between charm worker and the priest, seems to have existed since early times.

The pagan cult, as far as can be judged, recognised innumerable local and tribal gods, associated with the various activities of the people, such as war, agriculture, etc., or representing personifications; and an equally important cult of trees, stones and waters, in which, according to some, gods or spirits were supposed to reign. The Slavs of the East could not swear by trees, fountains or stones (but the priests gave accused persons the choice of trial by ploughshare, iron or

custom can in any sense be said to live, though it come out of the past it is also a part of actuality and a factor of present-day life and psychology. The popular religion is more sophisticated, and probably greatly more varied than any reconstruction of primitive cults that could be made. It depends on the vigour of the church organisation locally how far a distinction is made between standard Christian practice and the rest, and how far the non-Christian part of tradition is looked upon as not wholly in conformity with the nominal faith. Left to itself the folk-mind blends diverse elements into a single law. Certainly custom, particularly religious custom, is not in origin a direct response to the physical environment. Adjustment to the demands of a ruling class, for instance, is not expressed only on the economic plane. But there is a tendency to try to adapt institutions—even those forced upon a community—to material circumstances. Hence the permeation of all peasant cults by the dominant interest in provision for life and the staying of disaster. The Church would have had little chance of survival here had its rites not received an economic and apotropaic interpretation, far removed from the spiritual benefits of its written doctrine.